It’s been just over two months since Kathleen Hicks stepped down as US deputy secretary of defense. As the highest-ranking woman in Pentagon history, Hicks shaped US military posture through an era defined by renewed competition between powerful countries and a scramble to modernize defense technology.
She’s currently taking a break before jumping into her (still unannounced) next act. “It’s been refreshing,” she says—but disconnecting isn’t easy. She continues to monitor defense developments closely and expresses concern over potential setbacks: “New administrations have new priorities, and that’s completely expected, but I do worry about just stalling out on progress that we’ve built over a number of administrations.”
Over the past three decades, Hicks has watched the Pentagon transform—politically, strategically, and technologically. She entered government in the 1990s at the tail end of the Cold War, when optimism and a belief in global cooperation still dominated US foreign policy. But that optimism dimmed. After 9/11, the focus shifted to counterterrorism and nonstate actors. Then came Russia’s resurgence and China’s growing assertiveness. Hicks took two previous breaks from government work—the first to complete a PhD at MIT and the second to join the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she focused on defense strategy. “By the time I returned in 2021,” she says, “there was one actor—the PRC (People’s Republic of China)—that had the capability and the will to really contest the international system as it’s set up.”
In this conversation with MIT Technology Review, Hicks reflects on how the Pentagon is adapting—or failing to adapt—to a new era of geopolitical competition. She discusses China’s technological rise, the future of AI in warfare, and her signature initiative, Replicator, a Pentagon initiative to rapidly field thousands of low-cost autonomous systems such as drones.
You’ve described China as a “talented fast follower.” Do you still believe that, especially given recent developments in AI and other technologies?
Yes, I do. China is the biggest pacing challenge we face, which means it sets the pace for most capability areas for what we need to be able to defeat to deter them. For example, surface maritime capability, missile capability, stealth fighter capability. They set their minds to achieving a certain capability, they tend to get there, and they tend to get there even faster.
That said, they have a substantial amount of corruption, and they haven’t been engaged in a real conflict or combat operation in the way that Western militaries have trained for or been involved in, and that is a huge X factor in how effective they would be.
China has made major technological strides, and the old narrative of its being a follower is breaking down—not just in commercial tech, but more broadly. Do you think the US still holds a strategic advantage?
I would never want to underestimate their ability—or any nation’s ability—to innovate organically when they put their minds to it. But I still think it’s a helpful comparison to look at the US model. Because we’re a system of free minds, free people, and free markets, we have the potential to generate much more innovation culturally and organically than a statist model does. That’s our advantage—if we can realize it.
China is ahead in manufacturing, especially when it comes to drones and other unmanned systems. How big a problem is that for US defense, and can the US catch up?
I do think it’s a massive problem. When we were conceiving Replicator, one of the big concerns was that DJI had just jumped way out ahead on the manufacturing side, and the US had been left behind. A lot of manufacturers here believe they can catch up if given the right contracts—and I agree with that.
We also spent time identifying broader supply-chain vulnerabilities. Microelectronics was a big one. Critical minerals. Batteries. People sometimes think batteries are just about electrification, but they’re fundamental across our systems—even on ships in the Navy.
When it comes to drones specifically, I actually think it’s a solvable problem. The issue isn’t complexity. It’s just about getting enough mass of contracts to scale up manufacturing. If we do that, I believe the US can absolutely compete.
The Replicator drone program was one of your key initiatives. It promised a very fast timeline—especially compared with the typical defense acquisition cycle. Was that achievable? How is that progressing?
When I left in January, we had still lined up for proving out this summer, and I still believe we should see some completion this year. I hope Congress will stay very engaged in trying to ensure that the capability, in fact, comes to fruition. Even just this week with Secretary [Pete] Hegseth out in the Indo-Pacific, he made some passing reference to the [US Indo-Pacific Command] commander, Admiral [Samuel] Paparo, having the flexibility to create the capability needed, and that gives me a lot of confidence of consistency.
Can you talk about how Replicator fits into broader efforts to speed up defense innovation? What’s actually changing inside the system?
Traditionally, defense acquisition is slow and serial—one step after another, which works for massive, long-term systems like submarines. But for things like drones, that just doesn’t cut it. With Replicator, we aimed to shift to a parallel model: integrating hardware, software, policy, and testing all at once. That’s how you get speed—by breaking down silos and running things simultaneously.
It’s not about “Move fast and break things.” You still have to test and evaluate responsibly. But this approach shows we can move faster without sacrificing accountability—and that’s a big cultural shift.
How important is AI to the future of national defense?
It’s central. The future of warfare will be about speed and precision—decision advantage. AI helps enable that. It’s about integrating capabilities to create faster, more accurate decision-making: for achieving military objectives, for reducing civilian casualties, and for being able to deter effectively. But we’ve also emphasized responsible AI. If it’s not safe, it’s not going to be effective. That’s been a key focus across administrations.
What about generative AI specifically? Does it have real strategic significance yet, or is it still in the experimental phase?
It does have significance, especially for decision-making and efficiency. We had an effort called Project Lima where we looked at use cases for generative AI—where it might be most useful, and what the rules for responsible use should look like. Some of the biggest use may come first in the back office—human resources, auditing, logistics. But the ability to use generative AI to create a network of capability around unmanned systems or information exchange, either in Replicator or JADC2? That’s where it becomes a real advantage. But those back-office areas are where I would anticipate to see big gains first.
[Editor’s note: JADC2 is Joint All-Domain Command and Control, a DOD initiative to connect sensors from all branches of the armed forces into a unified network powered by artificial intelligence.]
In recent years, we’ve seen more tech industry figures stepping into national defense conversations—sometimes pushing strong political views or advocating for deregulation. How do you see Silicon Valley’s growing influence on US defense strategy?
There’s a long history of innovation in this country coming from outside the government—people who look at big national problems and want to help solve them. That kind of engagement is good, especially when their technical expertise lines up with real national security needs.
But that’s not just one stakeholder group. A healthy democracy includes others, too—workers, environmental voices, allies. We need to reconcile all of that through a functioning democratic process. That’s the only way this works.
How do you view the involvement of prominent tech entrepreneurs, such as Elon Musk, in shaping national defense policies?
I believe it’s not healthy for any democracy when a single individual wields more power than their technical expertise or official role justifies. We need strong institutions, not just strong personalities.
The US has long attracted top STEM talent from around the world, including many researchers from China. But in recent years, immigration hurdles and heightened scrutiny have made it harder for foreign-born scientists to stay. Do you see this as a threat to US innovation?
I think you have to be confident that you have a secure research community to do secure work. But much of the work that underpins national defense that’s STEM-related research doesn’t need to be tightly secured in that way, and it really is dependent on a diverse ecosystem of talent. Cutting off talent pipelines is like eating our seed corn. Programs like H-1B visas are really important.
And it’s not just about international talent—we need to make sure people from underrepresented communities here in the US see national security as a space where they can contribute. If they don’t feel valued or trusted, they’re less likely to come in and stay.
What do you see as the biggest challenge the Department of Defense faces today?
I do think the trust—or the lack of it—is a big challenge. Whether it’s trust in government broadly or specific concerns like military spending, audits, or politicization of the uniformed military, that issue manifests in everything DOD is trying to get done. It affects our ability to work with Congress, with allies, with industry, and with the American people. If people don’t believe you’re working in their interest, it’s hard to get anything done.
