Our 15-month investigation into death and surveillance along the US-Mexico border began with a simple question: Why did so many people die near government surveillance towers meant to help track and apprehend them? This story is part of Dying on Camera, a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego. Journalists in both newsrooms spent the past year examining the failures of border surveillance technology and uncovering the stories of the people who die in the borderlands. To answer that question, we looked through thousands of pages of government documents, visited the border multiple times, and interviewed more than 45 people, including current and former White House advisors, presidential appointees, Border Patrol agents, medical examiners, sheriffs, humanitarian volunteers, and employees of tech companies. The result of our investigation is the first comprehensive map and analysis of deaths near border surveillance towers. Here’s how we built it, what decisions we made along the way, and what the data can and can’t tell us. Our data The investigation relied on knowing where migrants have died and where and when US Customs and Border Protection towers were installed. We analyzed cases dating back to 2015, allowing us to cover different border policies, presidential administrations, and tower technologies. Migrant deaths The US-Mexico border has been called the world’s deadliest land border, and Border Patrol estimates that more than 10,000 people have died during crossings since 2000—a figure that’s widely considered an undercount. But the amount of information available publicly on where and when these people died, and who they were, varies widely. Some remains are never discovered, and for those that are, there’s no national protocol for how the records are handled.
We considered a case for further analysis if we could confirm three basic things: whether the person was believed to have been crossing the border, where the remains were found, and roughly when the person died. We created our dataset by merging existing ones that had been compiled and shared by other organizations, including No More Deaths, Humane Borders, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, with new records we obtained ourselves from more than a dozen agencies.
Public records requests in Texas Texas was the biggest missing link in most existing databases of migrant deaths. Unlike Arizona, it has no initiative to share records online, and unlike New Mexico, it leaves individual counties to handle their own death investigations. Some records for those individual counties existed, compiled by a handful of dedicated researchers, but nothing was comprehensive or current. We identified 17 counties in Texas that would be relevant to our investigation: Culberson, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Dimmit, Webb, Zapata, Jim Hogg, Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron, Kenedy, Brooks, and Duval. There are other counties in which migrants have died, but they do not have areas covered by surveillance towers and were therefore excluded. In most of these counties, locally elected administrative judges called justices of the peace collect the most comprehensive information on local deaths. But records requests submitted to these individual judges can stall for years (indeed, some of our requests to justices of the peace remain unfilled more than a year after we filed them). Reports from justices of the peace sometimes leave out the scene or location details we needed; some justices never even visit the place where a migrant died, instead formally declaring the person deceased over FaceTime with the first responders on scene. The border wall between Sunland Park, New Mexico and Puerto de Anapra, Mexico.GETTY IMAGES MIT Technology Review instead filed records requests to the sheriffs of these 17 counties beginning in July 2025. These agencies are often first on the scene when a death is discovered, and their reports can have more detailed information on where remains were found. But relying on sheriffs’ records means our analysis undercounts migrant deaths in Texas, as it doesn’t include any deaths handled by local or state police. After we filed a request, it took periods of near daily calls to the offices to receive the records, if we received them at all. Some were provided with no charge. Other counties charged between $300 and $1,300 to fill our request. Counties warned that their records were incomplete, with an unknown number lost during a move, damaged, destroyed, or misplaced during transitions between sheriffs. Those delays were compounded because most agencies do not record whether a person is believed to have been crossing the border when they died. That’s despite provisions in some counties that allow officers to track far more granular details about other situations; Zapata County reports have a checkbox to indicate whether jewels were stolen in a burglary, for example, while Cameron County reports have one for whether a burglar entered through a chimney. Without a way to readily identify migrant deaths, offices had to pull records by hand, making the process slower, more costly, and more prone to error. We received usable records from 14 of these counties (records have yet to be received from Dimmit or Duval, and Maverick’s office charged a per-record fee that was cost prohibitive). Agencies generally sent us police reports for each individual case, amounting to over 4,000 pages of records in total. Some were handwritten documents.
Except for the reports from Kenedy, Webb, and Hidalgo Counties, we pulled out the relevant information by hand. For those three counties, which sent large volumes of records, we used Anthropic’s Claude, accessed via API, to inspect each case report and pull out coordinates of the spots where remains were found; then we checked batches of those cases by hand to verify the AI’s accuracy. Agencies sent us records on a rolling basis from July 2025 to February 2026, and most did not specify the date through which their records were current. We generally trusted that agencies sent us cases they believed involved migrant deaths, since they had the most information about each case. But some records clearly suggested otherwise (indicating, for example, that someone died at home), and we excluded those cases. Several hundred cases were removed from our analysis because they didn’t include enough information for us to be certain where the remains were found. In fewer than 100 cases, coordinates were not listed but the description was specific enough for us to locate a point within 0.25 miles of where they were found—so we kept those in. Compared with agencies in other states along the border, those in Texas provide far fewer details regarding how long ago someone may have died before remains were found or how far the decomposition of those remains had progressed. Some reports included this information, but many didn’t. While autopsy records sometimes have more details, many migrant autopsies in south Texas are done through the Webb County Medical Examiner, which charges a fee for each report. That was cost prohibitive given the scale of our analysis. MIT Technology Review consulted with Greg Hess, director of Arizona’s Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, on a framework for translating descriptions of the scenes, bodies, and causes of death available in many of these records into rough estimates for when a person may have died (more detail on this process is provided below). In total, we included more than 1,500 cases from our Texas records requests in our final analysis. Accessing Arizona records directly The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona handles death investigations for all border counties in the state except Yuma (we sourced Yuma’s records from the organization No More Deaths, as detailed below). The office determines which cases it believes to be border crossers. It publishes a data portal for these migrant deaths that’s updated monthly and shares its data with the organization Humane Borders, which then publishes it in a map and database. We included the data from 2015 through April 2026.
Humane Borders notes for each case how precise the location description is. We included only cases with GPS coordinates precise to within 300 feet. Collecting these coordinates has been standard practice since around 2012. The records also include an estimate of when the individual died, ranging from less than a day to at least six to eight months before remains were found. In total, we included more than 1,700 cases from Humane Borders in our analysis.
Data collected by No More Deaths To obtain data on deaths in California, New Mexico, Arizona’s Yuma County, and El Paso and Hudspeth Counties in Texas, we turned to the nonprofit organization No More Deaths, which has tracked migrant deaths since 2004. It publishes information about its records requests and its methodology. Many of the cases in its database include GPS coordinates, sometimes with notes that the location is only approximate—for example, accurate to within half a mile or one mile. We included only cases where the location was known to within a quarter-mile. Migrants, most with children, follow a path along the concertina wire where ultimately they will placed under guard by Border Patrol after having crossed the Rio Grande on May 27, 2022 in Eagle Pass, Texas.JOHN LAMPARSKI/NURPHOTO VIA AP No More Death’s database includes, when available, information on the level of decomposition in which each set of remains was found. As with cases in Texas, MIT Technology Review consulted with PCOME’s Greg Hess on a framework for translating this information into rough estimates for when a person may have died. Here’s where the No More Deaths data used in our analysis comes from: In California, No More Deaths requests records from the San Diego County medical examiner and the Imperial County coroner. Its latest data for Imperial County is from December 2025, and its latest for San Diego County is from October 2025. In Yuma County, Arizona, No More Deaths requests records from the Yuma County medical examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In New Mexico, the organization requests data from the state’s Office of the Medical Investigator. Unlike most states, New Mexico has a statewide medical examiner, allowing No More Deaths to obtain migrant death data for the entire state. The latest data is from July 2025. For Hudspeth County, Texas, No More Deaths requests records from justices of the peace in Districts 1 and 2. The latest data is from December 2023. For El Paso County, Texas, records were from the El Paso County Office of the Medical Examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In total, we included nearly 1,000 cases from No More Deaths in our analysis. Total cases reviewed When accounting for all our data sources and excluding deaths without specific enough records to determine where remains were found, we analyzed a total of nearly 4,000 cases.
Other notes We generally assume that a person died where their remains were found. That may not necessarily be true: Remains can be moved by other people, flowing water, or animals. But medical examiners and researchers we consulted said such cases are rare. We excluded cases in which the virtual wall did not appear relevant. For example, we removed cases involving people who died inside Border Patrol stations or in car crashes during pursuits. The deaths we analyzed reflect a variety of causes that may seem at first like very different sorts of surveillance failure. If someone slowly died of dehydration within view of a camera, for example, agents would have had far more time to intervene than they would have in a case where someone drowned quickly in a river or canal. But we included all these deaths because, in each one, the virtual wall could have prompted a response from agents. Surveillance towers Including a tower in our analysis required knowing three things: its location, its type (so that we could judge how far it is supposed to see), and the time it was installed.
Locations The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been tracking and mapping CBP surveillance towers since 2023, using on-the-ground reporting, satellite imagery, and government documents obtained through public records requests. Its tally is an undercount; government records suggest that about 800 towers are currently deployed, while EFF has logged about 600. Our analysis therefore misses deaths that occurred near towers not yet catalogued by EFF. MIT Technology Review worked closely with EFF’s director of investigations, Dave Maass, throughout this project. Our tower data began with the database published by EFF in April 2026, but that map did not include towers that have been removed. We consulted EFF for the details on these former towers and added them to our database. We generally use EFF’s reference numbers for individual towers, but we changed some to ensure that each tower has a unique identifier. The locations are identified by GPS coordinates. We verified each tower’s coordinates by analyzing satellite imagery. Tower types Our analysis focused on towers of three main types. Certain towers mapped by EFF don’t fall into any of those categories, so we excluded them because it’s difficult to obtain information about how far they are supposed to be able to see. This includes some towers that are installed at Border Patrol checkpoints or stations. An integrated fixed tower (IFT) on Coronado Peak, Cochise County, Arizona.CREATIVE COMMONS An autonomous surveillance tower (AST) near Sunland Park, New Mexico.CENGIZ YAR FOR MITTR To know how far the main tower types could see, we consulted materials from tech companies and EFF’s research, led our own review of government documents, and interviewed former Border Patrol agents and officials. The distances described are consistent across these sources. But they are advertised estimates, not contractual guarantees: Some government records redact more specific information about a tower’s surveillance range in particular locations, citing security concerns. When towers were present To know if a tower in place now was present when someone died, it’s essential to know not just where it’s located but also when it was put there. To figure this out, we used multiple sources of satellite imagery. Maass, at EFF, had previously analyzed some of the towers to determine when they first appeared. MIT Technology Review checked satellite imagery for these towers to confirm these timelines, and then checked for all the remaining towers. For each tower, we logged the date that it first appeared and, if it eventually disappeared, the last date it was present. We spent months meticulously checking when hundreds of towers appeared in multiple sources of satellite imagery to confirm there were no contradictions. This is easier for certain tower types than others; towers from Anduril, for example, tend to go up where there was no prior infrastructure, and it’s fairly easy to see how a patch of empty desert gave way to the new tower and its trademark solar panels. Other towers, like IFTs, were often built on or near existing structures. For these, we leaned more closely on EFF’s expertise in analyzing the imagery. When imagery wasn’t sufficient, we used Google Street View, government documents, or photographs collected by EFF to verify when towers went up. One limitation is that historical imagery of towers along the border is not available for every day in the past. Especially for older towers or those in remote locations, images may have been taken months or even a year apart. A tower visible in May and again in December could theoretically have been removed and reinstalled in the intervening months. But most tower systems are permanent structures. And multiple Border Patrol agents told us that even towers that are meant to be mobile, like autonomous towers, are in practice very rarely taken down or moved (consistent with this, we observed that semipermanent fences were erected around the sites of many Anduril towers). Another limitation is that even if a tower is visible at a particular time, that does not mean it was online. We can’t verify that it was functional, receiving power, or transmitting data. Our analysis therefore establishes when a tower was present, not whether it was operational. Heights We conducted a topographical analysis, detailed below, to see whether a tower’s view of a given person might have been blocked by the terrain. This required estimating how tall each tower is. We included a minimum and maximum height for each tower, based on research from EFF. In select cases where the surveillance system was not on a typical tower but mounted to an existing structure, like a water tower or building, we used satellite imagery to estimate its height. The higher a tower is, the farther it can see. Our analysis With the data we collected, we could begin to see which deaths happened in range of the virtual wall. But for a given match between a set of remains and a tower to count, it needed to satisfy two criteria: 1) Distance: The death must have happened within the published surveillance range of the nearby camera. 2) Timing: The tower had to be present when the person was estimated to have died. An autonomous surveillance tower from Anduril captured January 6, 2022. Distance Minho Kim, an outside collaborator who is now a postdoctoral researcher at Stanford with a focus on wildfire mapping, led the distance analysis. His software ingested our database of human remains and our database of towers. Then it created a row for each time a set of remains was found near a given tower, along with the distance between the two. We then checked whether, for each match, the tower was actually present when the person died. Timing Sometimes, as with the Arizona cases, an estimate of when someone died is given in the original data; the medical examiner may note that a person died more than three weeks but less than five weeks before remains were found, for example. In other cases, we used the level of decomposition, the cause of death, or both to calculate a window of time in which the person would likely have died. Finally, we compared this window with the time when we determined the tower was built. This step took us many months and involved reviewing original police reports for hundreds of cases, inspecting photos of bodies, cross-referencing cases with news articles, interviewing medical examiners, and researching decomposition timelines. The resulting death windows are approximate, but they are the best estimates we could make from the information available in each case. We assigned different confidence levels to cases based on how these dates lined up. If a person’s entire estimated death window fell well after a tower was first observed, we felt confident the tower was present when they died. If any part of the death window fell before the tower was first observed, we excluded the case. Many cases involve skeletal remains. Remains decompose differently depending on location and season, but when records didn’t provide a specific estimate, we conservatively estimated that skeletal remains had been there for at least six months. For these and other cases without a specific estimate of when the person died, we used three years as a conservative cutoff: If a tower had been present for at least three years before the remains were found, we included the case, judging it unlikely that the person had died before the tower was installed and remained undiscovered that long. If the tower had been present for less than three years, we excluded it. Viewshed It is possible that someone who died within range of a tower could have been blocked from the tower’s view by terrain, vegetation, or buildings. We estimated the impact of this issue with a technique called topographical analysis. Kim, our collaborator, led this part of the analysis. Here’s how it works: Imagine a map of the border region divided into a grid, with each square having one value for that area’s elevation. Take a given match between a set of remains and a tower and draw a line between the tower’s estimated height and an estimated height of 5’ 6″ for the person who died. If the terrain along that path rises high enough to block the line between the two points, we estimate the tower’s view as obstructed. If it doesn’t, we estimate the view as clear. It’s not perfect. In the elevation data we used, each square represents an area 30 meters wide, or about 98 feet, and is assigned a single elevation. That means smaller changes in the terrain can be lost, particularly in steep or rugged areas where elevation changes quickly. Our analysis is therefore less about re-creating exactly what a tower could see than providing a rough estimate of whether terrain may have blocked a tower’s view of the spot where someone died. We include results on our map whether a clear line of sight was estimated or not. Even if the location where someone died was blocked from a tower’s view, the person may have passed through areas visible to the tower before reaching that spot. It’s much harder to estimate whether a line of sight was blocked by vegetation. We are less concerned about this limitation because virtual-wall towers use thermal imaging, which can detect body heat through light vegetation. Dense vegetation, however, can still obstruct their view. Buildings pose a greater challenge. We could not reliably account for their locations and heights. Instead, we reviewed each tower’s surroundings and flagged towers located in or near urban areas. These notes warn readers that buildings may have limited what those towers could see. As the sun sets near McAllen TX, migrants that have crossed the Rio Grande surrender to U.S. Border Patrol near an area known as Rincon. MANI ALBRECHT/U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION Beyond the data The most fundamental question in each of these cases, and for the families of anyone who died, is whether the US government saw someone attempting to cross into the country and never intercepted them—or never saw them at all. This is all but impossible to answer with records or data—Border Patrol doesn’t disclose which alerts came in surrounding any given migrant death, and footage isn’t retained unless an internal investigation is triggered, which doesn’t happen unless a migrant dies while in custody. MIT Technology Review instead conducted dozens of interviews with people who worked for Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, or the Department of Homeland Security or who served as presidential advisors. These conversations yielded previously unreported details about how agents use surveillance technology, turned up instances where it has underperformed, and underscored how seldom its effectiveness is evaluated internally. We also sought out friends and family members of people who died near surveillance towers, using additional records, social media, and other research tools to find them. We approached these interviews using best practices for trauma-informed reporting. Beginning in September 2025, MIT Technology Review requested interviews with current Border Patrol agents and leadership at CBP, and we asked to visit the border to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the latest autonomous tower program. Following delays, which were in part related to DHS funding lapses, in July 2026 we were told our media request had been approved at the local level in Big Bend, Texas. We wanted to visit this area because Border Patrol is expanding the number of Anduril towers there. But when the request went up to the DHS headquarters for a final sign-off, the agency denied it. Before publishing our investigation, we sent detailed questions to CBP, Anduril, General Dynamics and Elbit. CBP and Anduril responded, but did not substantively address our questions. General Dynamics referred us to CBP. Elbit did not respond to our questions. MIT Technology Review thanks the following for their assistance with this project: Minho Kim, Stanford University Greg Hess, Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner Stephanie Leutert, University of Texas at Austin Don White, Brooks County Sheriff’s Office
