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How we made the first comprehensive map of deaths along the US border’s “virtual wall”

Our 15-month investigation into death and surveillance along the US-Mexico border began with a simple question: Why did so many people die near government surveillance towers meant to help track and apprehend them? This story is part of Dying on Camera, a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego. Journalists in both newsrooms spent the past year examining the failures of border surveillance technology and uncovering the stories of the people who die in the borderlands. To answer that question, we looked through thousands of pages of government documents, visited the border multiple times, and interviewed more than 45 people, including current and former White House advisors, presidential appointees, Border Patrol agents, medical examiners, sheriffs, humanitarian volunteers, and employees of tech companies. The result of our investigation is the first comprehensive map and analysis of deaths near border surveillance towers. Here’s how we built it, what decisions we made along the way, and what the data can and can’t tell us. Our data The investigation relied on knowing where migrants have died and where and when US Customs and Border Protection towers were installed. We analyzed cases dating back to 2015, allowing us to cover different border policies, presidential administrations, and tower technologies. Migrant deaths The US-Mexico border has been called the world’s deadliest land border, and Border Patrol estimates that more than 10,000 people have died during crossings since 2000—a figure that’s widely considered an undercount. But the amount of information available publicly on where and when these people died, and who they were, varies widely. Some remains are never discovered, and for those that are, there’s no national protocol for how the records are handled.
We considered a case for further analysis if we could confirm three basic things: whether the person was believed to have been crossing the border, where the remains were found, and roughly when the person died.  We created our dataset by merging existing ones that had been compiled and shared by other organizations, including No More Deaths, Humane Borders, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, with new records we obtained ourselves from more than a dozen agencies.
Public records requests in Texas Texas was the biggest missing link in most existing databases of migrant deaths. Unlike Arizona, it has no initiative to share records online, and unlike New Mexico, it leaves individual counties to handle their own death investigations. Some records for those individual counties existed, compiled by a handful of dedicated researchers, but nothing was comprehensive or current.  We identified 17 counties in Texas that would be relevant to our investigation: Culberson, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Dimmit, Webb, Zapata, Jim Hogg, Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron, Kenedy, Brooks, and Duval. There are other counties in which migrants have died, but they do not have areas covered by surveillance towers and were therefore excluded. In most of these counties, locally elected administrative judges called justices of the peace collect the most comprehensive information on local deaths. But records requests submitted to these individual judges can stall for years (indeed, some of our requests to justices of the peace remain unfilled more than a year after we filed them). Reports from justices of the peace sometimes leave out the scene or location details we needed; some justices never even visit the place where a migrant died, instead formally declaring the person deceased over FaceTime with the first responders on scene. The border wall between Sunland Park, New Mexico and Puerto de Anapra, Mexico.GETTY IMAGES MIT Technology Review instead filed records requests to the sheriffs of these 17 counties beginning in July 2025. These agencies are often first on the scene when a death is discovered, and their reports can have more detailed information on where remains were found. But relying on sheriffs’ records means our analysis undercounts migrant deaths in Texas, as it doesn’t include any deaths handled by local or state police. After we filed a request, it took periods of near daily calls to the offices to receive the records, if we received them at all. Some were provided with no charge. Other counties charged between $300 and $1,300 to fill our request. Counties warned that their records were incomplete, with an unknown number lost during a move, damaged, destroyed, or misplaced during transitions between sheriffs. Those delays were compounded because most agencies do not record whether a person is believed to have been crossing the border when they died. That’s despite provisions in some counties that allow officers to track far more granular details about other situations; Zapata County reports have a checkbox to indicate whether jewels were stolen in a burglary, for example, while Cameron County reports have one for whether a burglar entered through a chimney. Without a way to readily identify migrant deaths, offices had to pull records by hand, making the process slower, more costly, and more prone to error. We received usable records from 14 of these counties (records have yet to be received from Dimmit or Duval, and Maverick’s office charged a per-record fee that was cost prohibitive). Agencies generally sent us police reports for each individual case, amounting to over 4,000 pages of records in total. Some were handwritten documents. 

Except for the reports from Kenedy, Webb, and Hidalgo Counties, we pulled out the relevant information by hand. For those three counties, which sent large volumes of records, we used Anthropic’s Claude, accessed via API, to inspect each case report and pull out coordinates of the spots where remains were found; then we checked batches of those cases by hand to verify the AI’s accuracy. Agencies sent us records on a rolling basis from July 2025 to February 2026, and most did not specify the date through which their records were current. We generally trusted that agencies sent us cases they believed involved migrant deaths, since they had the most information about each case. But some records clearly suggested otherwise (indicating, for example, that someone died at home), and we excluded those cases. Several hundred cases were removed from our analysis because they didn’t include enough information for us to be certain where the remains were found. In fewer than 100 cases, coordinates were not listed but the description was specific enough for us to locate a point within 0.25 miles of where they were found—so we kept those in.  Compared with agencies in other states along the border, those in Texas provide far fewer details regarding how long ago someone may have died before remains were found or how far the decomposition of those remains had progressed. Some reports included this information, but many didn’t. While autopsy records sometimes have more details, many migrant autopsies in south Texas are done through the Webb County Medical Examiner, which charges a fee for each report. That was cost prohibitive given the scale of our analysis. MIT Technology Review consulted with Greg Hess, director of Arizona’s Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, on a framework for translating descriptions of the scenes, bodies, and causes of death available in many of these records into rough estimates for when a person may have died (more detail on this process is provided below). In total, we included more than 1,500 cases from our Texas records requests in our final analysis. Accessing Arizona records directly The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona handles death investigations for all border counties in the state except Yuma (we sourced Yuma’s records from the organization No More Deaths, as detailed below). The office determines which cases it believes to be border crossers. It publishes a data portal for these migrant deaths that’s updated monthly and shares its data with the organization Humane Borders, which then publishes it in a map and database. We included the data from 2015 through April 2026.
Humane Borders notes for each case how precise the location description is. We included only cases with GPS coordinates precise to within 300 feet. Collecting these coordinates has been standard practice since around 2012. The records also include an estimate of when the individual died, ranging from less than a day to at least six to eight months before remains were found. In total, we included more than 1,700 cases from Humane Borders in our analysis.
Data collected by No More Deaths To obtain data on deaths in California, New Mexico, Arizona’s Yuma County, and El Paso and Hudspeth Counties in Texas, we turned to the nonprofit organization No More Deaths, which has tracked migrant deaths since 2004. It publishes information about its records requests and its methodology.  Many of the cases in its database include GPS coordinates, sometimes with notes that the location is only approximate—for example, accurate to within half a mile or one mile. We included only cases where the location was known to within a quarter-mile. Migrants, most with children, follow a path along the concertina wire where ultimately they will placed under guard by Border Patrol after having crossed the Rio Grande on May 27, 2022 in Eagle Pass, Texas.JOHN LAMPARSKI/NURPHOTO VIA AP No More Death’s database includes, when available, information on the level of decomposition in which each set of remains was found. As with cases in Texas, MIT Technology Review consulted with PCOME’s Greg Hess on a framework for translating this information into rough estimates for when a person may have died.  Here’s where the No More Deaths data used in our analysis comes from: In California, No More Deaths requests records from the San Diego County medical examiner and the Imperial County coroner. Its latest data for Imperial County is from December 2025, and its latest for San Diego County is from October 2025.  In Yuma County, Arizona, No More Deaths requests records from the Yuma County medical examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In New Mexico, the organization requests data from the state’s Office of the Medical Investigator. Unlike most states, New Mexico has a statewide medical examiner, allowing No More Deaths to obtain migrant death data for the entire state. The latest data is from July 2025. For Hudspeth County, Texas, No More Deaths requests records from justices of the peace in Districts 1 and 2. The latest data is from December 2023. For El Paso County, Texas, records were from the El Paso County Office of the Medical Examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In total, we included nearly 1,000 cases from No More Deaths in our analysis.  Total cases reviewed When accounting for all our data sources and excluding deaths without specific enough records to determine where remains were found, we analyzed a total of nearly 4,000 cases. 
Other notes  We generally assume that a person died where their remains were found. That may not necessarily be true: Remains can be moved by other people, flowing water, or animals. But medical examiners and researchers we consulted said such cases are rare. We excluded cases in which the virtual wall did not appear relevant. For example, we removed cases involving people who died inside Border Patrol stations or in car crashes during pursuits.  The deaths we analyzed reflect a variety of causes that may seem at first like very different sorts of surveillance failure. If someone slowly died of dehydration within view of a camera, for example, agents would have had far more time to intervene than they would have in a case where someone drowned quickly in a river or canal. But we included all these deaths because, in each one, the virtual wall could have prompted a response from agents. Surveillance towers Including a tower in our analysis required knowing three things: its location, its type (so that we could judge how far it is supposed to see), and the time it was installed. 
Locations The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been tracking and mapping CBP surveillance towers since 2023, using on-the-ground reporting, satellite imagery, and government documents obtained through public records requests. Its tally is an undercount; government records suggest that about 800 towers are currently deployed, while EFF has logged about 600. Our analysis therefore misses deaths that occurred near towers not yet catalogued by EFF. MIT Technology Review worked closely with EFF’s director of investigations, Dave Maass, throughout this project. Our tower data began with the database published by EFF in April 2026, but that map did not include towers that have been removed. We consulted EFF for the details on these former towers and added them to our database. We generally use EFF’s reference numbers for individual towers, but we changed some to ensure that each tower has a unique identifier. The locations are identified by GPS coordinates. We verified each tower’s coordinates by analyzing satellite imagery. Tower types Our analysis focused on towers of three main types. Certain towers mapped by EFF don’t fall into any of those categories, so we excluded them because it’s difficult to obtain information about how far they are supposed to be able to see. This includes some towers that are installed at Border Patrol checkpoints or stations. An integrated fixed tower (IFT) on Coronado Peak, Cochise County, Arizona.CREATIVE COMMONS An autonomous surveillance tower (AST) near Sunland Park, New Mexico.CENGIZ YAR FOR MITTR To know how far the main tower types could see, we consulted materials from tech companies and EFF’s research, led our own review of government documents, and interviewed former Border Patrol agents and officials. The distances described are consistent across these sources. But they are advertised estimates, not contractual guarantees: Some government records redact more specific information about a tower’s surveillance range in particular locations, citing security concerns. When towers were present To know if a tower in place now was present when someone died, it’s essential to know not just where it’s located but also when it was put there. To figure this out, we used multiple sources of satellite imagery.  Maass, at EFF, had previously analyzed some of the towers to determine when they first appeared. MIT Technology Review checked satellite imagery for these towers to confirm these timelines, and then checked for all the remaining towers. For each tower, we logged the date that it first appeared and, if it eventually disappeared, the last date it was present. We spent months meticulously checking when hundreds of towers appeared in multiple sources of satellite imagery to confirm there were no contradictions.  This is easier for certain tower types than others; towers from Anduril, for example, tend to go up where there was no prior infrastructure, and it’s fairly easy to see how a patch of empty desert gave way to the new tower and its trademark solar panels. Other towers, like IFTs, were often built on or near existing structures. For these, we leaned more closely on EFF’s expertise in analyzing the imagery.  When imagery wasn’t sufficient, we used Google Street View, government documents, or photographs collected by EFF to verify when towers went up. One limitation is that historical imagery of towers along the border is not available for every day in the past. Especially for older towers or those in remote locations, images may have been taken months or even a year apart. A tower visible in May and again in December could theoretically have been removed and reinstalled in the intervening months. But most tower systems are permanent structures. And multiple Border Patrol agents told us that even towers that are meant to be mobile, like autonomous towers, are in practice very rarely taken down or moved (consistent with this, we observed that semipermanent fences were erected around the sites of many Anduril towers). Another limitation is that even if a tower is visible at a particular time, that does not mean it was online. We can’t verify that it was functional, receiving power, or transmitting data. Our analysis therefore establishes when a tower was present, not whether it was operational. Heights We conducted a topographical analysis, detailed below, to see whether a tower’s view of a given person might have been blocked by the terrain. This required estimating how tall each tower is.  We included a minimum and maximum height for each tower, based on research from EFF. In select cases where the surveillance system was not on a typical tower but mounted to an existing structure, like a water tower or building, we used satellite imagery to estimate its height. The higher a tower is, the farther it can see. Our analysis With the data we collected, we could begin to see which deaths happened in range of the virtual wall. But for a given match between a set of remains and a tower to count, it needed to satisfy two criteria: 1) Distance: The death must have happened within the published surveillance range of the nearby camera. 2) Timing: The tower had to be present when the person was estimated to have died. An autonomous surveillance tower from Anduril captured January 6, 2022. Distance Minho Kim, an outside collaborator who is now a postdoctoral researcher at Stanford with a focus on wildfire mapping, led the distance analysis. His software ingested our database of human remains and our database of towers. Then it created a row for each time a set of remains was found near a given tower, along with the distance between the two. We then checked whether, for each match, the tower was actually present when the person died. Timing Sometimes, as with the Arizona cases, an estimate of when someone died is given in the original data; the medical examiner may note that a person died more than three weeks but less than five weeks before remains were found, for example.  In other cases, we used the level of decomposition, the cause of death, or both to calculate a window of time in which the person would likely have died. Finally, we compared this window with the time when we determined the tower was built.  This step took us many months and involved reviewing original police reports for hundreds of cases, inspecting photos of bodies, cross-referencing cases with news articles, interviewing medical examiners, and researching decomposition timelines. The resulting death windows are approximate, but they are the best estimates we could make from the information available in each case. We assigned different confidence levels to cases based on how these dates lined up. If a person’s entire estimated death window fell well after a tower was first observed, we felt confident the tower was present when they died. If any part of the death window fell before the tower was first observed, we excluded the case. Many cases involve skeletal remains. Remains decompose differently depending on location and season, but when records didn’t provide a specific estimate, we conservatively estimated that skeletal remains had been there for at least six months. For these and other cases without a specific estimate of when the person died, we used three years as a conservative cutoff: If a tower had been present for at least three years before the remains were found, we included the case, judging it unlikely that the person had died before the tower was installed and remained undiscovered that long. If the tower had been present for less than three years, we excluded it. Viewshed It is possible that someone who died within range of a tower could have been blocked from the tower’s view by terrain, vegetation, or buildings. We estimated the impact of this issue with a technique called topographical analysis. Kim, our collaborator, led this part of the analysis. Here’s how it works: Imagine a map of the border region divided into a grid, with each square having one value for that area’s elevation. Take a given match between a set of remains and a tower and draw a line between the tower’s estimated height and an estimated height of 5’ 6″ for the person who died. If the terrain along that path rises high enough to block the line between the two points, we estimate the tower’s view as obstructed. If it doesn’t, we estimate the view as clear. It’s not perfect. In the elevation data we used, each square represents an area 30 meters wide, or about 98 feet, and is assigned a single elevation. That means smaller changes in the terrain can be lost, particularly in steep or rugged areas where elevation changes quickly. Our analysis is therefore less about re-creating exactly what a tower could see than providing a rough estimate of whether terrain may have blocked a tower’s view of the spot where someone died.  We include results on our map whether a clear line of sight was estimated or not. Even if the location where someone died was blocked from a tower’s view, the person may have passed through areas visible to the tower before reaching that spot. It’s much harder to estimate whether a line of sight was blocked by vegetation. We are less concerned about this limitation because virtual-wall towers use thermal imaging, which can detect body heat through light vegetation. Dense vegetation, however, can still obstruct their view. Buildings pose a greater challenge. We could not reliably account for their locations and heights. Instead, we reviewed each tower’s surroundings and flagged towers located in or near urban areas. These notes warn readers that buildings may have limited what those towers could see. As the sun sets near McAllen TX, migrants that have crossed the Rio Grande surrender to U.S. Border Patrol near an area known as Rincon. MANI ALBRECHT/U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION Beyond the data  The most fundamental question in each of these cases, and for the families of anyone who died, is whether the US government saw someone attempting to cross into the country and never intercepted them—or never saw them at all.  This is all but impossible to answer with records or data—Border Patrol doesn’t disclose which alerts came in surrounding any given migrant death, and footage isn’t retained unless an internal investigation is triggered, which doesn’t happen unless a migrant dies while in custody. MIT Technology Review instead conducted dozens of interviews with people who worked for Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, or the Department of Homeland Security or who served as presidential advisors. These conversations yielded previously unreported details about how agents use surveillance technology, turned up instances where it has underperformed, and underscored how seldom its effectiveness is evaluated internally. We also sought out friends and family members of people who died near surveillance towers, using additional records, social media, and other research tools to find them. We approached these interviews using best practices for trauma-informed reporting. Beginning in September 2025, MIT Technology Review requested interviews with current Border Patrol agents and leadership at CBP, and we asked to visit the border to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the latest autonomous tower program. Following delays, which were in part related to DHS funding lapses, in July 2026 we were told our media request had been approved at the local level in Big Bend, Texas. We wanted to visit this area because Border Patrol is expanding the number of Anduril towers there. But when the request went up to the DHS headquarters for a final sign-off, the agency denied it. Before publishing our investigation, we sent detailed questions to CBP, Anduril, General Dynamics and Elbit. CBP and Anduril responded, but did not substantively address our questions. General Dynamics referred us to CBP. Elbit did not respond to our questions. MIT Technology Review thanks the following for their assistance with this project: Minho Kim, Stanford University Greg Hess, Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner  Stephanie Leutert, University of Texas at Austin Don White, Brooks County Sheriff’s Office

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Energy Secretary Secures Carolinas’ Grid Amidst Hot Weather Conditions

WASHINGTON—The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued an emergency order to mitigate the risk of blackouts in the Carolinas amid hot weather conditions. Issued pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, the order authorizes Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) to dispatch specified resources and to order their operation as needed to maintain reliability. The order also authorizes Duke, in collaboration with its Transmission Owners, to direct backup generation resources to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 or during an EEA 3. This order was issued pursuant to an application from Duke submitted on September 18, 2026. “Today’s order will help secure reliable electricity access for millions of American families and businesses across North and South Carolina by making additional power generation, including backup power, available to use as needed,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. “It should come as no surprise that during the end of summer and early fall, there are fewer hours of daylight—and therefore, less power generation from solar power. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation and others have warned of the potential dangers late summer temperature spikes can pose to the grid when leaders prematurely retire reliable power sources. While past leaders’ energy subtraction policies have made the grid more vulnerable to blackouts when the sun doesn’t shine or the wind doesn’t blow, this administration remains committed to using every available tool to prevent blackouts.”  DOE estimates more than 35 GW of unused backup generation remains available nationwide.  The order is in effect upon issuance on September 18, 2026, through September 21, 2026. 

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Trump Administration Moves to Keep Indiana Coal Plants Operating to Support Grid Reliability

WASHINGTON—U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright issued emergency orders to keep two Indiana coal plants operational to ensure Americans in the Midwest region of the United States have continued access to affordable, reliable, and secure electricity. The orders direct the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO), CenterPoint Energy, and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) to take all measures necessary to ensure specified generation units at both the R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations in Indiana are available to operate. Certain generation units at these coal plants were scheduled to shut down at the end of 2025.  The orders will minimize the risk of unnecessary blackouts for the American people. Since the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) original orders were issued on December 23, 2025, the Schahfer and Culley coal plants have proven critical to MISO’s operations, operating during periods of high energy demand and low levels of intermittent energy production, including during Winter Storm Fern.   “Forcing reliable, dispatchable coal generation off the grid would compromise energy reliability and needlessly raises energy costs for Americans,” said Energy Secretary Wright. “Midwestern families should not be forced to pay the price for the misguided energy subtraction policies of the past. They deserve affordable, reliable, and secure energy, regardless of the wind blowing or the sun shining.” Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, coal generating plants across the country are being saved from premature retirement. For example, in 2025, more than 17 gigawatts of coal power electricity generation were saved from going offline.  The availability of R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations to operate will continue to be an asset to maintain reliability in the MISO region and is necessary to address elevated reliability risks in that region during extreme weather and reduce the risk of power outages that could threaten public health and safety. As

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Enbridge launches open season for West Texas Express natural gas pipeline

Enbridge has launched a non-binding open season for its proposed 2-bcfd West Texas Express (WTX) natural gas pipeline project, designed to transport Permian basin supply west from the Waha area to markets in and around El Paso, Tex. The proposed project responds to growing demand for reliable natural gas supplies from proposed power generation, utilities, generators, and industrial customers such as data centers across west Texas and downstream markets in Mexico, New Mexico, and Arizona, Enbridge said. WTX is currently expected to include more than 150 miles of new 42-in. OD pipeline. The project could also include laterals serving Hudspeth County, Tex., and delivery points at the US-Mexico border. Enbridge said WTX can be designed to connect with existing pipeline infrastructure based on customer requirements identified through the open season. Final capacity, routing, receipt and delivery points, and system design will be informed by market interest. Subject to securing sufficient commercial support and obtaining required approvals, Enbridge is targeting a fourth-quarter 2029 in-service date. The open season will close at 5 p.m. CDT, Sept. 25, 2026. Enbridge last week agreed to acquire Tallgrass Energy LP’s crude oil business for $2.55 billion in cash.

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Editorial: Let’s make a deal

The Trump administration announced Aug. 28, 2026, that the US and Venezuela had agreed to give the US majority control over development of more than 65 billion bbl of Venezuelan proven oil reserves. The agreement presents an extraordinary opportunity to the US oil industry, but also a great deal of risk, at least some of which should seem familiar. Before private capital follows Washington into Venezuela, the industry needs answers to some fundamental questions about the deal’s legal durability, political risk, commercial structure, and ultimate purpose. The agreement covers 17 fields and roughly 20% of Venezuela’s proved reserves. Development would be led by Barbados-based North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP)—controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt López—under what the White House described as a 100-year concession. It’s a huge deal. But its timeline alone stretches credulity. A typical international concession agreement would last for 20-30 years, a term consistent with both in-country media reports and outside analysis. As noted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Venezuela’s Organic Hydrocarbon Law, passed in January 2026 after Nicolás Maduro’s ouster, only allows “production participation contracts” to private companies, not concessions of any duration.1 Venezuela’s constitution also creates questions about the agreement. Article 150 requires National Assembly approval of “public interest” contracts to entities based outside Venezuela while Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the State. Beyond the deal itself Looking beyond legal and structural technicalities, large questions remain regarding both stable governance in Venezuela and the viability of any agreements struck in its absence. There has been no meaningful progress toward establishing a functional democracy in Venezuela since the US captured Maduro. Both Acting President (and former VP) Delcy Rodríguez and Betancourt owe much of their political and personal fortunes to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. Rodríguez has done a

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US sanctions bill targets Russian energy but gives Trump broad discretion

US President Donald Trump is poised to sign legislation aimed at increasing economic pressure on Russia over its war in Ukraine by targeting Russian oil and gas revenues and countries that continue to buy Russian energy. While the measure mandates broad sanctions, it gives Trump wide discretion over implementation, including which countries face tariffs, the tariff rates imposed, and whether sanctions provisions are waived. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, named for the late South Carolina senator who championed the legislation, passed the House Sept. 16 by a vote of 262-159 after clearing the Senate 86-11 in August. The measure now awaits Trump’s signature. The White House has said the administration supports the legislation and would recommend that Trump sign it into law. The legislation directs the president to impose broad sanctions and tariff measures targeting Russian energy exports and countries that facilitate sanctions evasion. However, Trump “may waive the application” of sanctions provisions, restrictions, or duties if he certifies to Congress that doing so is “in the national interest of the United States” and explains the basis for the decision. While the law mandates sanctions, it leaves key implementation decisions to the administration. Tariff provisions Within 30 days of enactment, the act requires the president to impose duties of up to 100% on goods imported from countries that fall within specified categories involving Russian oil and gas purchases or sanctions evasion. The covered countries include those among the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas by total volume during the 12 months preceding enactment, as well as countries that meet separate criteria for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. The administration must reassess those countries every 180 days. A country is exempt from the gas-related duties if its Russian gas imports accounted for

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How we made the first comprehensive map of deaths along the US border’s “virtual wall”

Our 15-month investigation into death and surveillance along the US-Mexico border began with a simple question: Why did so many people die near government surveillance towers meant to help track and apprehend them? This story is part of Dying on Camera, a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego. Journalists in both newsrooms spent the past year examining the failures of border surveillance technology and uncovering the stories of the people who die in the borderlands. To answer that question, we looked through thousands of pages of government documents, visited the border multiple times, and interviewed more than 45 people, including current and former White House advisors, presidential appointees, Border Patrol agents, medical examiners, sheriffs, humanitarian volunteers, and employees of tech companies. The result of our investigation is the first comprehensive map and analysis of deaths near border surveillance towers. Here’s how we built it, what decisions we made along the way, and what the data can and can’t tell us. Our data The investigation relied on knowing where migrants have died and where and when US Customs and Border Protection towers were installed. We analyzed cases dating back to 2015, allowing us to cover different border policies, presidential administrations, and tower technologies. Migrant deaths The US-Mexico border has been called the world’s deadliest land border, and Border Patrol estimates that more than 10,000 people have died during crossings since 2000—a figure that’s widely considered an undercount. But the amount of information available publicly on where and when these people died, and who they were, varies widely. Some remains are never discovered, and for those that are, there’s no national protocol for how the records are handled.
We considered a case for further analysis if we could confirm three basic things: whether the person was believed to have been crossing the border, where the remains were found, and roughly when the person died.  We created our dataset by merging existing ones that had been compiled and shared by other organizations, including No More Deaths, Humane Borders, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, with new records we obtained ourselves from more than a dozen agencies.
Public records requests in Texas Texas was the biggest missing link in most existing databases of migrant deaths. Unlike Arizona, it has no initiative to share records online, and unlike New Mexico, it leaves individual counties to handle their own death investigations. Some records for those individual counties existed, compiled by a handful of dedicated researchers, but nothing was comprehensive or current.  We identified 17 counties in Texas that would be relevant to our investigation: Culberson, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Dimmit, Webb, Zapata, Jim Hogg, Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron, Kenedy, Brooks, and Duval. There are other counties in which migrants have died, but they do not have areas covered by surveillance towers and were therefore excluded. In most of these counties, locally elected administrative judges called justices of the peace collect the most comprehensive information on local deaths. But records requests submitted to these individual judges can stall for years (indeed, some of our requests to justices of the peace remain unfilled more than a year after we filed them). Reports from justices of the peace sometimes leave out the scene or location details we needed; some justices never even visit the place where a migrant died, instead formally declaring the person deceased over FaceTime with the first responders on scene. The border wall between Sunland Park, New Mexico and Puerto de Anapra, Mexico.GETTY IMAGES MIT Technology Review instead filed records requests to the sheriffs of these 17 counties beginning in July 2025. These agencies are often first on the scene when a death is discovered, and their reports can have more detailed information on where remains were found. But relying on sheriffs’ records means our analysis undercounts migrant deaths in Texas, as it doesn’t include any deaths handled by local or state police. After we filed a request, it took periods of near daily calls to the offices to receive the records, if we received them at all. Some were provided with no charge. Other counties charged between $300 and $1,300 to fill our request. Counties warned that their records were incomplete, with an unknown number lost during a move, damaged, destroyed, or misplaced during transitions between sheriffs. Those delays were compounded because most agencies do not record whether a person is believed to have been crossing the border when they died. That’s despite provisions in some counties that allow officers to track far more granular details about other situations; Zapata County reports have a checkbox to indicate whether jewels were stolen in a burglary, for example, while Cameron County reports have one for whether a burglar entered through a chimney. Without a way to readily identify migrant deaths, offices had to pull records by hand, making the process slower, more costly, and more prone to error. We received usable records from 14 of these counties (records have yet to be received from Dimmit or Duval, and Maverick’s office charged a per-record fee that was cost prohibitive). Agencies generally sent us police reports for each individual case, amounting to over 4,000 pages of records in total. Some were handwritten documents. 

Except for the reports from Kenedy, Webb, and Hidalgo Counties, we pulled out the relevant information by hand. For those three counties, which sent large volumes of records, we used Anthropic’s Claude, accessed via API, to inspect each case report and pull out coordinates of the spots where remains were found; then we checked batches of those cases by hand to verify the AI’s accuracy. Agencies sent us records on a rolling basis from July 2025 to February 2026, and most did not specify the date through which their records were current. We generally trusted that agencies sent us cases they believed involved migrant deaths, since they had the most information about each case. But some records clearly suggested otherwise (indicating, for example, that someone died at home), and we excluded those cases. Several hundred cases were removed from our analysis because they didn’t include enough information for us to be certain where the remains were found. In fewer than 100 cases, coordinates were not listed but the description was specific enough for us to locate a point within 0.25 miles of where they were found—so we kept those in.  Compared with agencies in other states along the border, those in Texas provide far fewer details regarding how long ago someone may have died before remains were found or how far the decomposition of those remains had progressed. Some reports included this information, but many didn’t. While autopsy records sometimes have more details, many migrant autopsies in south Texas are done through the Webb County Medical Examiner, which charges a fee for each report. That was cost prohibitive given the scale of our analysis. MIT Technology Review consulted with Greg Hess, director of Arizona’s Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, on a framework for translating descriptions of the scenes, bodies, and causes of death available in many of these records into rough estimates for when a person may have died (more detail on this process is provided below). In total, we included more than 1,500 cases from our Texas records requests in our final analysis. Accessing Arizona records directly The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona handles death investigations for all border counties in the state except Yuma (we sourced Yuma’s records from the organization No More Deaths, as detailed below). The office determines which cases it believes to be border crossers. It publishes a data portal for these migrant deaths that’s updated monthly and shares its data with the organization Humane Borders, which then publishes it in a map and database. We included the data from 2015 through April 2026.
Humane Borders notes for each case how precise the location description is. We included only cases with GPS coordinates precise to within 300 feet. Collecting these coordinates has been standard practice since around 2012. The records also include an estimate of when the individual died, ranging from less than a day to at least six to eight months before remains were found. In total, we included more than 1,700 cases from Humane Borders in our analysis.
Data collected by No More Deaths To obtain data on deaths in California, New Mexico, Arizona’s Yuma County, and El Paso and Hudspeth Counties in Texas, we turned to the nonprofit organization No More Deaths, which has tracked migrant deaths since 2004. It publishes information about its records requests and its methodology.  Many of the cases in its database include GPS coordinates, sometimes with notes that the location is only approximate—for example, accurate to within half a mile or one mile. We included only cases where the location was known to within a quarter-mile. Migrants, most with children, follow a path along the concertina wire where ultimately they will placed under guard by Border Patrol after having crossed the Rio Grande on May 27, 2022 in Eagle Pass, Texas.JOHN LAMPARSKI/NURPHOTO VIA AP No More Death’s database includes, when available, information on the level of decomposition in which each set of remains was found. As with cases in Texas, MIT Technology Review consulted with PCOME’s Greg Hess on a framework for translating this information into rough estimates for when a person may have died.  Here’s where the No More Deaths data used in our analysis comes from: In California, No More Deaths requests records from the San Diego County medical examiner and the Imperial County coroner. Its latest data for Imperial County is from December 2025, and its latest for San Diego County is from October 2025.  In Yuma County, Arizona, No More Deaths requests records from the Yuma County medical examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In New Mexico, the organization requests data from the state’s Office of the Medical Investigator. Unlike most states, New Mexico has a statewide medical examiner, allowing No More Deaths to obtain migrant death data for the entire state. The latest data is from July 2025. For Hudspeth County, Texas, No More Deaths requests records from justices of the peace in Districts 1 and 2. The latest data is from December 2023. For El Paso County, Texas, records were from the El Paso County Office of the Medical Examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In total, we included nearly 1,000 cases from No More Deaths in our analysis.  Total cases reviewed When accounting for all our data sources and excluding deaths without specific enough records to determine where remains were found, we analyzed a total of nearly 4,000 cases. 
Other notes  We generally assume that a person died where their remains were found. That may not necessarily be true: Remains can be moved by other people, flowing water, or animals. But medical examiners and researchers we consulted said such cases are rare. We excluded cases in which the virtual wall did not appear relevant. For example, we removed cases involving people who died inside Border Patrol stations or in car crashes during pursuits.  The deaths we analyzed reflect a variety of causes that may seem at first like very different sorts of surveillance failure. If someone slowly died of dehydration within view of a camera, for example, agents would have had far more time to intervene than they would have in a case where someone drowned quickly in a river or canal. But we included all these deaths because, in each one, the virtual wall could have prompted a response from agents. Surveillance towers Including a tower in our analysis required knowing three things: its location, its type (so that we could judge how far it is supposed to see), and the time it was installed. 
Locations The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been tracking and mapping CBP surveillance towers since 2023, using on-the-ground reporting, satellite imagery, and government documents obtained through public records requests. Its tally is an undercount; government records suggest that about 800 towers are currently deployed, while EFF has logged about 600. Our analysis therefore misses deaths that occurred near towers not yet catalogued by EFF. MIT Technology Review worked closely with EFF’s director of investigations, Dave Maass, throughout this project. Our tower data began with the database published by EFF in April 2026, but that map did not include towers that have been removed. We consulted EFF for the details on these former towers and added them to our database. We generally use EFF’s reference numbers for individual towers, but we changed some to ensure that each tower has a unique identifier. The locations are identified by GPS coordinates. We verified each tower’s coordinates by analyzing satellite imagery. Tower types Our analysis focused on towers of three main types. Certain towers mapped by EFF don’t fall into any of those categories, so we excluded them because it’s difficult to obtain information about how far they are supposed to be able to see. This includes some towers that are installed at Border Patrol checkpoints or stations. An integrated fixed tower (IFT) on Coronado Peak, Cochise County, Arizona.CREATIVE COMMONS An autonomous surveillance tower (AST) near Sunland Park, New Mexico.CENGIZ YAR FOR MITTR To know how far the main tower types could see, we consulted materials from tech companies and EFF’s research, led our own review of government documents, and interviewed former Border Patrol agents and officials. The distances described are consistent across these sources. But they are advertised estimates, not contractual guarantees: Some government records redact more specific information about a tower’s surveillance range in particular locations, citing security concerns. When towers were present To know if a tower in place now was present when someone died, it’s essential to know not just where it’s located but also when it was put there. To figure this out, we used multiple sources of satellite imagery.  Maass, at EFF, had previously analyzed some of the towers to determine when they first appeared. MIT Technology Review checked satellite imagery for these towers to confirm these timelines, and then checked for all the remaining towers. For each tower, we logged the date that it first appeared and, if it eventually disappeared, the last date it was present. We spent months meticulously checking when hundreds of towers appeared in multiple sources of satellite imagery to confirm there were no contradictions.  This is easier for certain tower types than others; towers from Anduril, for example, tend to go up where there was no prior infrastructure, and it’s fairly easy to see how a patch of empty desert gave way to the new tower and its trademark solar panels. Other towers, like IFTs, were often built on or near existing structures. For these, we leaned more closely on EFF’s expertise in analyzing the imagery.  When imagery wasn’t sufficient, we used Google Street View, government documents, or photographs collected by EFF to verify when towers went up. One limitation is that historical imagery of towers along the border is not available for every day in the past. Especially for older towers or those in remote locations, images may have been taken months or even a year apart. A tower visible in May and again in December could theoretically have been removed and reinstalled in the intervening months. But most tower systems are permanent structures. And multiple Border Patrol agents told us that even towers that are meant to be mobile, like autonomous towers, are in practice very rarely taken down or moved (consistent with this, we observed that semipermanent fences were erected around the sites of many Anduril towers). Another limitation is that even if a tower is visible at a particular time, that does not mean it was online. We can’t verify that it was functional, receiving power, or transmitting data. Our analysis therefore establishes when a tower was present, not whether it was operational. Heights We conducted a topographical analysis, detailed below, to see whether a tower’s view of a given person might have been blocked by the terrain. This required estimating how tall each tower is.  We included a minimum and maximum height for each tower, based on research from EFF. In select cases where the surveillance system was not on a typical tower but mounted to an existing structure, like a water tower or building, we used satellite imagery to estimate its height. The higher a tower is, the farther it can see. Our analysis With the data we collected, we could begin to see which deaths happened in range of the virtual wall. But for a given match between a set of remains and a tower to count, it needed to satisfy two criteria: 1) Distance: The death must have happened within the published surveillance range of the nearby camera. 2) Timing: The tower had to be present when the person was estimated to have died. An autonomous surveillance tower from Anduril captured January 6, 2022. Distance Minho Kim, an outside collaborator who is now a postdoctoral researcher at Stanford with a focus on wildfire mapping, led the distance analysis. His software ingested our database of human remains and our database of towers. Then it created a row for each time a set of remains was found near a given tower, along with the distance between the two. We then checked whether, for each match, the tower was actually present when the person died. Timing Sometimes, as with the Arizona cases, an estimate of when someone died is given in the original data; the medical examiner may note that a person died more than three weeks but less than five weeks before remains were found, for example.  In other cases, we used the level of decomposition, the cause of death, or both to calculate a window of time in which the person would likely have died. Finally, we compared this window with the time when we determined the tower was built.  This step took us many months and involved reviewing original police reports for hundreds of cases, inspecting photos of bodies, cross-referencing cases with news articles, interviewing medical examiners, and researching decomposition timelines. The resulting death windows are approximate, but they are the best estimates we could make from the information available in each case. We assigned different confidence levels to cases based on how these dates lined up. If a person’s entire estimated death window fell well after a tower was first observed, we felt confident the tower was present when they died. If any part of the death window fell before the tower was first observed, we excluded the case. Many cases involve skeletal remains. Remains decompose differently depending on location and season, but when records didn’t provide a specific estimate, we conservatively estimated that skeletal remains had been there for at least six months. For these and other cases without a specific estimate of when the person died, we used three years as a conservative cutoff: If a tower had been present for at least three years before the remains were found, we included the case, judging it unlikely that the person had died before the tower was installed and remained undiscovered that long. If the tower had been present for less than three years, we excluded it. Viewshed It is possible that someone who died within range of a tower could have been blocked from the tower’s view by terrain, vegetation, or buildings. We estimated the impact of this issue with a technique called topographical analysis. Kim, our collaborator, led this part of the analysis. Here’s how it works: Imagine a map of the border region divided into a grid, with each square having one value for that area’s elevation. Take a given match between a set of remains and a tower and draw a line between the tower’s estimated height and an estimated height of 5’ 6″ for the person who died. If the terrain along that path rises high enough to block the line between the two points, we estimate the tower’s view as obstructed. If it doesn’t, we estimate the view as clear. It’s not perfect. In the elevation data we used, each square represents an area 30 meters wide, or about 98 feet, and is assigned a single elevation. That means smaller changes in the terrain can be lost, particularly in steep or rugged areas where elevation changes quickly. Our analysis is therefore less about re-creating exactly what a tower could see than providing a rough estimate of whether terrain may have blocked a tower’s view of the spot where someone died.  We include results on our map whether a clear line of sight was estimated or not. Even if the location where someone died was blocked from a tower’s view, the person may have passed through areas visible to the tower before reaching that spot. It’s much harder to estimate whether a line of sight was blocked by vegetation. We are less concerned about this limitation because virtual-wall towers use thermal imaging, which can detect body heat through light vegetation. Dense vegetation, however, can still obstruct their view. Buildings pose a greater challenge. We could not reliably account for their locations and heights. Instead, we reviewed each tower’s surroundings and flagged towers located in or near urban areas. These notes warn readers that buildings may have limited what those towers could see. As the sun sets near McAllen TX, migrants that have crossed the Rio Grande surrender to U.S. Border Patrol near an area known as Rincon. MANI ALBRECHT/U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION Beyond the data  The most fundamental question in each of these cases, and for the families of anyone who died, is whether the US government saw someone attempting to cross into the country and never intercepted them—or never saw them at all.  This is all but impossible to answer with records or data—Border Patrol doesn’t disclose which alerts came in surrounding any given migrant death, and footage isn’t retained unless an internal investigation is triggered, which doesn’t happen unless a migrant dies while in custody. MIT Technology Review instead conducted dozens of interviews with people who worked for Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, or the Department of Homeland Security or who served as presidential advisors. These conversations yielded previously unreported details about how agents use surveillance technology, turned up instances where it has underperformed, and underscored how seldom its effectiveness is evaluated internally. We also sought out friends and family members of people who died near surveillance towers, using additional records, social media, and other research tools to find them. We approached these interviews using best practices for trauma-informed reporting. Beginning in September 2025, MIT Technology Review requested interviews with current Border Patrol agents and leadership at CBP, and we asked to visit the border to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the latest autonomous tower program. Following delays, which were in part related to DHS funding lapses, in July 2026 we were told our media request had been approved at the local level in Big Bend, Texas. We wanted to visit this area because Border Patrol is expanding the number of Anduril towers there. But when the request went up to the DHS headquarters for a final sign-off, the agency denied it. Before publishing our investigation, we sent detailed questions to CBP, Anduril, General Dynamics and Elbit. CBP and Anduril responded, but did not substantively address our questions. General Dynamics referred us to CBP. Elbit did not respond to our questions. MIT Technology Review thanks the following for their assistance with this project: Minho Kim, Stanford University Greg Hess, Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner  Stephanie Leutert, University of Texas at Austin Don White, Brooks County Sheriff’s Office

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Energy Secretary Secures Carolinas’ Grid Amidst Hot Weather Conditions

WASHINGTON—The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued an emergency order to mitigate the risk of blackouts in the Carolinas amid hot weather conditions. Issued pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, the order authorizes Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) to dispatch specified resources and to order their operation as needed to maintain reliability. The order also authorizes Duke, in collaboration with its Transmission Owners, to direct backup generation resources to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 or during an EEA 3. This order was issued pursuant to an application from Duke submitted on September 18, 2026. “Today’s order will help secure reliable electricity access for millions of American families and businesses across North and South Carolina by making additional power generation, including backup power, available to use as needed,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. “It should come as no surprise that during the end of summer and early fall, there are fewer hours of daylight—and therefore, less power generation from solar power. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation and others have warned of the potential dangers late summer temperature spikes can pose to the grid when leaders prematurely retire reliable power sources. While past leaders’ energy subtraction policies have made the grid more vulnerable to blackouts when the sun doesn’t shine or the wind doesn’t blow, this administration remains committed to using every available tool to prevent blackouts.”  DOE estimates more than 35 GW of unused backup generation remains available nationwide.  The order is in effect upon issuance on September 18, 2026, through September 21, 2026. 

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Trump Administration Moves to Keep Indiana Coal Plants Operating to Support Grid Reliability

WASHINGTON—U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright issued emergency orders to keep two Indiana coal plants operational to ensure Americans in the Midwest region of the United States have continued access to affordable, reliable, and secure electricity. The orders direct the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO), CenterPoint Energy, and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) to take all measures necessary to ensure specified generation units at both the R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations in Indiana are available to operate. Certain generation units at these coal plants were scheduled to shut down at the end of 2025.  The orders will minimize the risk of unnecessary blackouts for the American people. Since the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) original orders were issued on December 23, 2025, the Schahfer and Culley coal plants have proven critical to MISO’s operations, operating during periods of high energy demand and low levels of intermittent energy production, including during Winter Storm Fern.   “Forcing reliable, dispatchable coal generation off the grid would compromise energy reliability and needlessly raises energy costs for Americans,” said Energy Secretary Wright. “Midwestern families should not be forced to pay the price for the misguided energy subtraction policies of the past. They deserve affordable, reliable, and secure energy, regardless of the wind blowing or the sun shining.” Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, coal generating plants across the country are being saved from premature retirement. For example, in 2025, more than 17 gigawatts of coal power electricity generation were saved from going offline.  The availability of R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations to operate will continue to be an asset to maintain reliability in the MISO region and is necessary to address elevated reliability risks in that region during extreme weather and reduce the risk of power outages that could threaten public health and safety. As

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Enbridge launches open season for West Texas Express natural gas pipeline

Enbridge has launched a non-binding open season for its proposed 2-bcfd West Texas Express (WTX) natural gas pipeline project, designed to transport Permian basin supply west from the Waha area to markets in and around El Paso, Tex. The proposed project responds to growing demand for reliable natural gas supplies from proposed power generation, utilities, generators, and industrial customers such as data centers across west Texas and downstream markets in Mexico, New Mexico, and Arizona, Enbridge said. WTX is currently expected to include more than 150 miles of new 42-in. OD pipeline. The project could also include laterals serving Hudspeth County, Tex., and delivery points at the US-Mexico border. Enbridge said WTX can be designed to connect with existing pipeline infrastructure based on customer requirements identified through the open season. Final capacity, routing, receipt and delivery points, and system design will be informed by market interest. Subject to securing sufficient commercial support and obtaining required approvals, Enbridge is targeting a fourth-quarter 2029 in-service date. The open season will close at 5 p.m. CDT, Sept. 25, 2026. Enbridge last week agreed to acquire Tallgrass Energy LP’s crude oil business for $2.55 billion in cash.

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Editorial: Let’s make a deal

The Trump administration announced Aug. 28, 2026, that the US and Venezuela had agreed to give the US majority control over development of more than 65 billion bbl of Venezuelan proven oil reserves. The agreement presents an extraordinary opportunity to the US oil industry, but also a great deal of risk, at least some of which should seem familiar. Before private capital follows Washington into Venezuela, the industry needs answers to some fundamental questions about the deal’s legal durability, political risk, commercial structure, and ultimate purpose. The agreement covers 17 fields and roughly 20% of Venezuela’s proved reserves. Development would be led by Barbados-based North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP)—controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt López—under what the White House described as a 100-year concession. It’s a huge deal. But its timeline alone stretches credulity. A typical international concession agreement would last for 20-30 years, a term consistent with both in-country media reports and outside analysis. As noted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Venezuela’s Organic Hydrocarbon Law, passed in January 2026 after Nicolás Maduro’s ouster, only allows “production participation contracts” to private companies, not concessions of any duration.1 Venezuela’s constitution also creates questions about the agreement. Article 150 requires National Assembly approval of “public interest” contracts to entities based outside Venezuela while Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the State. Beyond the deal itself Looking beyond legal and structural technicalities, large questions remain regarding both stable governance in Venezuela and the viability of any agreements struck in its absence. There has been no meaningful progress toward establishing a functional democracy in Venezuela since the US captured Maduro. Both Acting President (and former VP) Delcy Rodríguez and Betancourt owe much of their political and personal fortunes to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. Rodríguez has done a

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US sanctions bill targets Russian energy but gives Trump broad discretion

US President Donald Trump is poised to sign legislation aimed at increasing economic pressure on Russia over its war in Ukraine by targeting Russian oil and gas revenues and countries that continue to buy Russian energy. While the measure mandates broad sanctions, it gives Trump wide discretion over implementation, including which countries face tariffs, the tariff rates imposed, and whether sanctions provisions are waived. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, named for the late South Carolina senator who championed the legislation, passed the House Sept. 16 by a vote of 262-159 after clearing the Senate 86-11 in August. The measure now awaits Trump’s signature. The White House has said the administration supports the legislation and would recommend that Trump sign it into law. The legislation directs the president to impose broad sanctions and tariff measures targeting Russian energy exports and countries that facilitate sanctions evasion. However, Trump “may waive the application” of sanctions provisions, restrictions, or duties if he certifies to Congress that doing so is “in the national interest of the United States” and explains the basis for the decision. While the law mandates sanctions, it leaves key implementation decisions to the administration. Tariff provisions Within 30 days of enactment, the act requires the president to impose duties of up to 100% on goods imported from countries that fall within specified categories involving Russian oil and gas purchases or sanctions evasion. The covered countries include those among the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas by total volume during the 12 months preceding enactment, as well as countries that meet separate criteria for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. The administration must reassess those countries every 180 days. A country is exempt from the gas-related duties if its Russian gas imports accounted for

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US freezes Citgo board to protect pending $5.9-billion acquisition

The US Treasury Department Sept. 14 amended Venezuela’s sanctions license to prevent unauthorized changes to the governance of Citgo Petroleum Corp. and its two US corporate parent structures, PDV Holding Inc. and Citgo Holding Inc. The license now explicitly blocks any unauthorized “appointment, removal, or replacement of any director, officer, or other corporate governance official” at the three companies. The move comes as Venezuelan interim President Delcy Rodríguez works to regain control of the country’s overseas assets. Her administration has replaced law firms representing Venezuela and state-owned PDVSA in foreign litigation and arbitration, while opposition-appointed entities that have overseen Citgo are preparing to wind down. The license amendment freezes the current corporate boards until finalization of Amber Energy’s acquisition of PDV Holdings. The acquisition gives Amber Energy, owned by Elliott Investment Management, assets that include about 800,000 b/d of refining capacity on the US Gulf Coast and in the Midwest. It also obligates Amber to disperse $5.89 billion in a structured payout to 15 international creditors, including ConocoPhillips, whose assets were seized by the previous government. While a US federal court approved the deal, Amber still requires a US Treasury license to take title to the shares. The deal would also need to survive an appeal in the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia, where the Venezuelan government is arguing the price is too low. Venezuela and state-owned PDVSA would still be on the hook for about $15 billion in remaining payouts to companies for seized assets.

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S&P Global: Refined product tightness deepens

Russian refinery runs remain near July 2026 lows and are likely to recover only gradually from September onward. Russia’s ban on diesel exports has already removed 10% of waterborne supply from the global market. Further decline in Russian refinery runs could amplify the risk to global diesel markets by leading Russia to import fuel to backfill domestic needs, compounding the outright loss of the near 1 million b/d of diesel exports. Limited spare capacity raises winter risks Meanwhile, the world’s remaining unconstrained refining capacity is already running at close to maximum levels. Refinery utilization in the US has approached 97% this summer, while Europe and North America continue to operate at or near multi-decade highs in response to record margins. The industry is now approaching fall turnaround season with a significant incentive to keep pushing and little spare capacity left to offset unexpected disruptions. “The market has survived the first phase of the crisis because inventories, trade flows, and refinery flexibility absorbed much of the shock. Those shock absorbers are not disappearing, but they are becoming progressively weaker. Markets are entering winter with less room for error than they had in the spring,” said Daniel Evans, global head of fuels and refining research, S&P Global Energy. For governments and policymakers, the challenge is increasingly likely to center on balancing energy price affordability, inflation, and security of supply. High diesel prices directly impact costs for freight transport, agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and residential heating. Although the market has so far avoided an outright supply crisis, persistently low inventories, high prices, and limited spare capacity have heightened the risk of government interventions. Diesel remains the fuel most vulnerable to shortages. With a surge in demand during the harvest season, the approach of winter heating needs, depleted inventories, and no immediate prospect of supply

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Saudi pipeline shutdown threatens further global oil supply losses

Saudi Arabia has shut its 1,200-km (745-mile) East-West pipeline following Sept. 11, 2026, drone attacks. Saudi officials said the drones were launched from Iraq but have not disclosed the extent of any injuries or damage or provided a timetable for repairs. Satellite imagery released Sept. 13 appeared to show substantial damage to a pumping station along the pipeline. East-West, which has a maximum design capacity of 7 million b/d, had been operating at 2 million b/d in August according to Kpler, as increased Houthi attacks in and around Bab El-Mandeb reduced Red Sea traffic. Earlier in the Iran war, flows had been 4-5 million b/d, with the pipeline serving as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for Saudi exports. Stay updated on oil price volatility, shipping disruptions, LNG market analysis, and production output at OGJ’s Iran war content hub. Saudi oil buyers and traders told Reuters that stocks at Red Sea terminals could support exports for 5-7 days if the pipeline remains out of service. A prolonged shutdown could remove as much as 4% of global oil supply, according to market estimates. Repair estimates have ranged from several days to as long as 6 weeks. Saudi Arabia reported to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that its crude production declined to 6.2 million b/d in August, down from 10.9 million b/d in February. Overall OPEC+ crude production fell 1.5 million b/d in August to 33.1 million b/d. Production from the 17 quota-bound OPEC+ members declined 980,000 b/d to 27 million b/d, 7.3 million b/d below their August target. On Sept. 6, OPEC+ agreed to maintain October production targets at September levels. Global oil prices climbed sharply Sept. 14 in the wake of the shutdown. Brent crude futures rose above $108/bbl, reaching levels not seen since May, before retreating.

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Insights: Prioritizing process safety management over profits across the refining industry (Pt. 1)

In this Insights episode of the Oil & Gas Journal ReEnterprised podcast, downstream editor and lead reporter Robert Brelsford talks with Joe Barnes, principal of Barnes’ Engineering Consultants and a veteran oil and gas operations, maintenance, reliability, and major-projects leader with more than 30 years of industry experience. Barnes, who spent roughly half of his career in refining and half in exploration and production, discusses why process safety management must remain a central concern for everyone working in oil and gas—not only safety professionals. Drawing on his experience with a major refinery accident and the aftermath of a separate major offshore incident, Barnes explains why good intentions are not enough to prevent major incidents, particularly in times when the potential for high margins could tempt operator’s into promoting maximized production over execution of maintenance on processing and production installations to ensure safe and reliable operations. During the conversation, Robert and Joe examine recurring root causes identified through Barnes’ review of process-safety incidents dating back to the mid-1980s, including absence of  leadership, poor communication, inadequate risk identification and mitigation, aging equipment, deferred maintenance, workforce turnover, and the loss of experienced personnel. They also discuss why the industry has sometimes failed to consistently share and apply lessons from previous incidents, particularly when investigation findings are not widely accessible. The two consider the difference between personal safety and process safety metrics, the warning signs that preceded the 2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion, and the role of management of change (MOC) in evaluating staffing, maintenance, turnaround, efficiency, and capital-reduction decisions. Barnes also outlines the questions boards and executive leaders should be asking to ensure that process safety remains a business priority across economic cycles. Robert and Joe further explore how refineries can use past incident scenarios as practical training tools, strengthen external oversight

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Energy Department Launches $16 Million Prize To Grow the Mining and Critical Minerals Workforce

WASHINGTON—The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation (CMEI) today launched the PROSPECT Planning Prize to support universities in developing the skilled workforce required to produce, process, recover, and recycle critical minerals on American soil. Each winner will receive up to $1 million from a total prize pool of $16 million. “Mining and critical minerals professionals are essential to America’s success in manufacturing, AI, energy, and national security—but this country isn’t producing enough of them,” said Assistant Secretary of Energy Audrey Robertson. “Through this prize competition, DOE will empower universities to pursue more ambitious strategies for attracting and educating the workers we need for a robust critical mineral supply chain.” This prize competition is part of DOE’s $100 million Providing Opportunities for Specialized Education in Critical Technologies (PROSPECT) initiative, which delivers on President Trump’s bold agenda to restore American energy dominance, rebuild domestic supply chains, and reduce reliance on foreign adversaries for critical minerals. The initiative’s near-term goal is to double the number of graduates with mining, minerals, and associated supply chain credentials across the United States. U.S.-based academic institutions with prize-eligible degree programs are encouraged to submit plans. Proposed programs should aim to substantially increase the number of graduates and other credentialed professionals prepared for relevant mining and supply chain careers in the next two years. Programs may target a range of beneficiaries, including early-career professionals, incumbent workers, educators, and students in university, community college, or high school. Applications are now open. The deadline for submission is Oct. 5, 2026. Learn more about this competition, including key dates and submission details, on the PROSPECT Prize page. The PROSPECT Planning Prize is funded by CMEI and managed by the National Laboratory of the Rockies under the American-Made prize program. ###

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U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright Delivers U.S. National Statement at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria

VIENNA, AUSTRIA—U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright today delivered the U.S. National Statement at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. Secretary Wright’s full remarks from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference are below: I am honored to represent the United States of America at the 70th IAEA General Conference. This year, as we celebrate the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States, we reflect on a history defined by a tireless spirit of innovation and bold exploration. It was this American drive that, over seven decades ago, moved President Dwight D. Eisenhower to deliver his historic ‘Atoms for Peace’ address, sowing the seeds for the creation of this very Agency. Together, our high-level cooperation has achieved monumental milestones—pioneering global safeguards, securing vulnerable fissile materials across the globe, countering and preparing for radiological and nuclear threats, creating energy abundance, and advancing nuclear science to improve living standards. As the world’s foremost nuclear innovator, the United States remains steadfastly dedicated to the IAEA’s mission. I would like to take a moment to congratulate Timor Leste on becoming the newest member of the IAEA. America looks forward to working with you. Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, the United States is ushering in an American nuclear renaissance. President Trump directed the Administration to revitalize America’s nuclear sector, modernizing regulations, improving processes and streamlining advanced reactor testing to rebuild the nuclear industrial base. This agenda allows the United States to establish an expedited pathway for testing and approving advanced reactors, set standards for converting surplus uranium and plutonium into reactor fuel, and support the energy infrastructure needed for America’s reindustrialization and artificial intelligence. These actions advance President Trump’s bold goal of adding 300 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity in the United States by 2050.

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West of Orkney developers helped support 24 charities last year

The developers of the 2GW West of Orkney wind farm paid out a total of £18,000 to 24 organisations from its small donations fund in 2024. The money went to projects across Caithness, Sutherland and Orkney, including a mental health initiative in Thurso and a scheme by Dunnet Community Forest to improve the quality of meadows through the use of traditional scythes. Established in 2022, the fund offers up to £1,000 per project towards programmes in the far north. In addition to the small donations fund, the West of Orkney developers intend to follow other wind farms by establishing a community benefit fund once the project is operational. West of Orkney wind farm project director Stuart McAuley said: “Our donations programme is just one small way in which we can support some of the many valuable initiatives in Caithness, Sutherland and Orkney. “In every case we have been immensely impressed by the passion and professionalism each organisation brings, whether their focus is on sport, the arts, social care, education or the environment, and we hope the funds we provide help them achieve their goals.” In addition to the local donations scheme, the wind farm developers have helped fund a £1 million research and development programme led by EMEC in Orkney and a £1.2m education initiative led by UHI. It also provided £50,000 to support the FutureSkills apprenticeship programme in Caithness, with funds going to employment and training costs to help tackle skill shortages in the North of Scotland. The West of Orkney wind farm is being developed by Corio Generation, TotalEnergies and Renewable Infrastructure Development Group (RIDG). The project is among the leaders of the ScotWind cohort, having been the first to submit its offshore consent documents in late 2023. In addition, the project’s onshore plans were approved by the

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Biden bans US offshore oil and gas drilling ahead of Trump’s return

US President Joe Biden has announced a ban on offshore oil and gas drilling across vast swathes of the country’s coastal waters. The decision comes just weeks before his successor Donald Trump, who has vowed to increase US fossil fuel production, takes office. The drilling ban will affect 625 million acres of federal waters across America’s eastern and western coasts, the eastern Gulf of Mexico and Alaska’s Northern Bering Sea. The decision does not affect the western Gulf of Mexico, where much of American offshore oil and gas production occurs and is set to continue. In a statement, President Biden said he is taking action to protect the regions “from oil and natural gas drilling and the harm it can cause”. “My decision reflects what coastal communities, businesses, and beachgoers have known for a long time: that drilling off these coasts could cause irreversible damage to places we hold dear and is unnecessary to meet our nation’s energy needs,” Biden said. “It is not worth the risks. “As the climate crisis continues to threaten communities across the country and we are transitioning to a clean energy economy, now is the time to protect these coasts for our children and grandchildren.” Offshore drilling ban The White House said Biden used his authority under the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which allows presidents to withdraw areas from mineral leasing and drilling. However, the law does not give a president the right to unilaterally reverse a drilling ban without congressional approval. This means that Trump, who pledged to “unleash” US fossil fuel production during his re-election campaign, could find it difficult to overturn the ban after taking office. Sunset shot of the Shell Olympus platform in the foreground and the Shell Mars platform in the background in the Gulf of Mexico Trump

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The Download: our 10 Breakthrough Technologies for 2025

This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology. Introducing: MIT Technology Review’s 10 Breakthrough Technologies for 2025 Each year, we spend months researching and discussing which technologies will make the cut for our 10 Breakthrough Technologies list. We try to highlight a mix of items that reflect innovations happening in various fields. We look at consumer technologies, large industrial­-scale projects, biomedical advances, changes in computing, climate solutions, the latest in AI, and more.We’ve been publishing this list every year since 2001 and, frankly, have a great track record of flagging things that are poised to hit a tipping point. It’s hard to think of another industry that has as much of a hype machine behind it as tech does, so the real secret of the TR10 is really what we choose to leave off the list.Check out the full list of our 10 Breakthrough Technologies for 2025, which is front and center in our latest print issue. It’s all about the exciting innovations happening in the world right now, and includes some fascinating stories, such as: + How digital twins of human organs are set to transform medical treatment and shake up how we trial new drugs.+ What will it take for us to fully trust robots? The answer is a complicated one.+ Wind is an underutilized resource that has the potential to steer the notoriously dirty shipping industry toward a greener future. Read the full story.+ After decades of frustration, machine-learning tools are helping ecologists to unlock a treasure trove of acoustic bird data—and to shed much-needed light on their migration habits. Read the full story. 
+ How poop could help feed the planet—yes, really. Read the full story.
Roundtables: Unveiling the 10 Breakthrough Technologies of 2025 Last week, Amy Nordrum, our executive editor, joined our news editor Charlotte Jee to unveil our 10 Breakthrough Technologies of 2025 in an exclusive Roundtable discussion. Subscribers can watch their conversation back here. And, if you’re interested in previous discussions about topics ranging from mixed reality tech to gene editing to AI’s climate impact, check out some of the highlights from the past year’s events. This international surveillance project aims to protect wheat from deadly diseases For as long as there’s been domesticated wheat (about 8,000 years), there has been harvest-devastating rust. Breeding efforts in the mid-20th century led to rust-resistant wheat strains that boosted crop yields, and rust epidemics receded in much of the world.But now, after decades, rusts are considered a reemerging disease in Europe, at least partly due to climate change.  An international initiative hopes to turn the tide by scaling up a system to track wheat diseases and forecast potential outbreaks to governments and farmers in close to real time. And by doing so, they hope to protect a crop that supplies about one-fifth of the world’s calories. Read the full story. —Shaoni Bhattacharya

The must-reads I’ve combed the internet to find you today’s most fun/important/scary/fascinating stories about technology. 1 Meta has taken down its creepy AI profiles Following a big backlash from unhappy users. (NBC News)+ Many of the profiles were likely to have been live from as far back as 2023. (404 Media)+ It also appears they were never very popular in the first place. (The Verge) 2 Uber and Lyft are racing to catch up with their robotaxi rivalsAfter abandoning their own self-driving projects years ago. (WSJ $)+ China’s Pony.ai is gearing up to expand to Hong Kong.  (Reuters)3 Elon Musk is going after NASA He’s largely veered away from criticising the space agency publicly—until now. (Wired $)+ SpaceX’s Starship rocket has a legion of scientist fans. (The Guardian)+ What’s next for NASA’s giant moon rocket? (MIT Technology Review) 4 How Sam Altman actually runs OpenAIFeaturing three-hour meetings and a whole lot of Slack messages. (Bloomberg $)+ ChatGPT Pro is a pricey loss-maker, apparently. (MIT Technology Review) 5 The dangerous allure of TikTokMigrants’ online portrayal of their experiences in America aren’t always reflective of their realities. (New Yorker $) 6 Demand for electricity is skyrocketingAnd AI is only a part of it. (Economist $)+ AI’s search for more energy is growing more urgent. (MIT Technology Review) 7 The messy ethics of writing religious sermons using AISkeptics aren’t convinced the technology should be used to channel spirituality. (NYT $)
8 How a wildlife app became an invaluable wildfire trackerWatch Duty has become a safeguarding sensation across the US west. (The Guardian)+ How AI can help spot wildfires. (MIT Technology Review) 9 Computer scientists just love oracles 🔮 Hypothetical devices are a surprisingly important part of computing. (Quanta Magazine)
10 Pet tech is booming 🐾But not all gadgets are made equal. (FT $)+ These scientists are working to extend the lifespan of pet dogs—and their owners. (MIT Technology Review) Quote of the day “The next kind of wave of this is like, well, what is AI doing for me right now other than telling me that I have AI?” —Anshel Sag, principal analyst at Moor Insights and Strategy, tells Wired a lot of companies’ AI claims are overblown.
The big story Broadband funding for Native communities could finally connect some of America’s most isolated places September 2022 Rural and Native communities in the US have long had lower rates of cellular and broadband connectivity than urban areas, where four out of every five Americans live. Outside the cities and suburbs, which occupy barely 3% of US land, reliable internet service can still be hard to come by.
The covid-19 pandemic underscored the problem as Native communities locked down and moved school and other essential daily activities online. But it also kicked off an unprecedented surge of relief funding to solve it. Read the full story. —Robert Chaney We can still have nice things A place for comfort, fun and distraction to brighten up your day. (Got any ideas? Drop me a line or skeet ’em at me.) + Rollerskating Spice Girls is exactly what your Monday morning needs.+ It’s not just you, some people really do look like their dogs!+ I’m not sure if this is actually the world’s healthiest meal, but it sure looks tasty.+ Ah, the old “bitten by a rabid fox chestnut.”

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Equinor Secures $3 Billion Financing for US Offshore Wind Project

Equinor ASA has announced a final investment decision on Empire Wind 1 and financial close for $3 billion in debt financing for the under-construction project offshore Long Island, expected to power 500,000 New York homes. The Norwegian majority state-owned energy major said in a statement it intends to farm down ownership “to further enhance value and reduce exposure”. Equinor has taken full ownership of Empire Wind 1 and 2 since last year, in a swap transaction with 50 percent co-venturer BP PLC that allowed the former to exit the Beacon Wind lease, also a 50-50 venture between the two. Equinor has yet to complete a portion of the transaction under which it would also acquire BP’s 50 percent share in the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal lease, according to the latest transaction update on Equinor’s website. The lease involves a terminal conversion project that was intended to serve as an interconnection station for Beacon Wind and Empire Wind, as agreed on by the two companies and the state of New York in 2022.  “The expected total capital investments, including fees for the use of the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal, are approximately $5 billion including the effect of expected future tax credits (ITCs)”, said the statement on Equinor’s website announcing financial close. Equinor did not disclose its backers, only saying, “The final group of lenders includes some of the most experienced lenders in the sector along with many of Equinor’s relationship banks”. “Empire Wind 1 will be the first offshore wind project to connect into the New York City grid”, the statement added. “The redevelopment of the South Brooklyn Marine Terminal and construction of Empire Wind 1 will create more than 1,000 union jobs in the construction phase”, Equinor said. On February 22, 2024, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) announced

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USA Crude Oil Stocks Drop Week on Week

U.S. commercial crude oil inventories, excluding those in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), decreased by 1.2 million barrels from the week ending December 20 to the week ending December 27, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) highlighted in its latest weekly petroleum status report, which was released on January 2. Crude oil stocks, excluding the SPR, stood at 415.6 million barrels on December 27, 416.8 million barrels on December 20, and 431.1 million barrels on December 29, 2023, the report revealed. Crude oil in the SPR came in at 393.6 million barrels on December 27, 393.3 million barrels on December 20, and 354.4 million barrels on December 29, 2023, the report showed. Total petroleum stocks – including crude oil, total motor gasoline, fuel ethanol, kerosene type jet fuel, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, propane/propylene, and other oils – stood at 1.623 billion barrels on December 27, the report revealed. This figure was up 9.6 million barrels week on week and up 17.8 million barrels year on year, the report outlined. “At 415.6 million barrels, U.S. crude oil inventories are about five percent below the five year average for this time of year,” the EIA said in its latest report. “Total motor gasoline inventories increased by 7.7 million barrels from last week and are slightly below the five year average for this time of year. Finished gasoline inventories decreased last week while blending components inventories increased last week,” it added. “Distillate fuel inventories increased by 6.4 million barrels last week and are about six percent below the five year average for this time of year. Propane/propylene inventories decreased by 0.6 million barrels from last week and are 10 percent above the five year average for this time of year,” it went on to state. In the report, the EIA noted

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More telecom firms were breached by Chinese hackers than previously reported

Broader implications for US infrastructure The Salt Typhoon revelations follow a broader pattern of state-sponsored cyber operations targeting the US technology ecosystem. The telecom sector, serving as a backbone for industries including finance, energy, and transportation, remains particularly vulnerable to such attacks. While Chinese officials have dismissed the accusations as disinformation, the recurring breaches underscore the pressing need for international collaboration and policy enforcement to deter future attacks. The Salt Typhoon campaign has uncovered alarming gaps in the cybersecurity of US telecommunications firms, with breaches now extending to over a dozen networks. Federal agencies and private firms must act swiftly to mitigate risks as adversaries continue to evolve their attack strategies. Strengthening oversight, fostering industry-wide collaboration, and investing in advanced defense mechanisms are essential steps toward safeguarding national security and public trust.

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The Download: AI doomers, whistleblowing agents, and de-aged livers

This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology. The AI industry has taken a doomer turn. What now? AI chiefs Dario Amodei, Sam Altman, Elon Musk, and Demis Hassabis are suddenly all in agreement: the latest generation of LLMs aren’t safe and everyone needs to figure out what to do about it.  It’s easy to be cynical. With trillion-dollar IPOs in their sights, OpenAI and Anthropic need to reassure investors that they’re the grown-ups in the room while at the same time hinting at the power of the monsters they have created and intend to tame. Calling for a slowdown does both.  Still, the vibe at the top of these firms really does appear to have shifted. But what does a slowdown actually mean, and how much should we trust the companies calling for one? 
Read the full story about what could come next. —Will Douglas Heaven
This article is from The Algorithm, our weekly AI newsletter. Sign up to receive it in your inbox every Monday. Roundtables: could AI really kill us all? AI extinction fears have gone from a fringe idea to a serious concern among people working at the world’s leading AI labs. But how credible are those fears, and what should we make of the warnings? Today, MIT Technology Review executive editor Niall Firth, senior AI editor Will Douglas Heaven and AI reporter Grace Huckins will unpack the debate in a subscriber-only Roundtable. They’ll look at where AI extinction fears come from, whether they hold any water and what we should do if they do. Tune in today at 16:00 BST / 11:00am EST / 8:00am PST. Want to join the conversation? Subscribe to MIT Technology Review for exclusive access to all our Roundtables. AI agents blew the whistle on their cheating colleagues A group of AI agents asked to solve a series of math problems split into rival factions—when some cheated, others tried to stop them.  That whistleblowing behavior, seen for the first time in a recent experiment run by Google DeepMind, could have implications for alignment researchers trying to keep swarms of autonomous AI agents in line.  The experiment offers a glimpse of how AI agents might police one another. But it also shows how quickly things can go off the rails when they’re left to interact on their own.

Find out what happens when AI agents start enforcing their own rules. —Amit Katwala Donated livers can be made biologically younger Once an organ is removed from a donor’s body, the clock starts ticking. Surgeons usually flush it with a preservative solution, bag it and put it on ice, where it immediately starts to degrade. The team has a matter of hours to get it into a recipient’s body. But there’s another option: machines that pump donated organs with nutrients and remove waste products, essentially giving them a chance to be back in a body. Now, scientists have found that livers kept on these systems seem to get younger, at least at a molecular level. The finding could help explain why organs kept on these machines tend to do better after transplantation. It could also lead to new ways to test the health of donated organs and potentially repair ones that might otherwise be discarded. Here’s what scientists discovered about making donated livers biologically younger. —Jessica Hamzelou The must-reads
I’ve combed the internet to find you today’s most fun/important/scary/fascinating stories about technology. 1 Trump has called AI safety fears a “hoax” and rejected more safeguardsHe says stronger guardrails could undermine America’s AI advantage. (NBC)+ Trump has united against AI doomerism with Nvidia’s Jensen Huang. (Axios)+ Anthropic’s co-founder says AI kill switches may need to be mandatory. (BBC)+ Bill Gates says we’ve passed AI’s risk thresholds. (MIT Technology Review)
2 OpenAI contractors are reading people’s ChatGPT chats And you can bet the vast majority of its 900 million users haven’t got a clue. (404 Media)+ LLMs could supercharge mass surveillance. (MIT Technology Review) 3 The US military has confirmed it has weapons in orbitIt’s the first time the Pentagon has disclosed this. (Ars Technica)+ Officials have not disclosed what the weapons are. (BBC) 4 A new brain implant can translate speech and gestures at the same timeThe system converts brain activity into words and avatar movements. (Nature)+ It helps people with paralysis communicate more naturally. (New Scientist $)+ Eventually, they could control robots or exoskeletons. (Economist $)+ China has approved the first invasive BCI. (MIT Technology Review) 5 New York has seized a dozen celebrity deepfake websitesIt’s the biggest-ever legal action against harmful deepfake sites. (CNN)+ Deepfakes have targeted at least 138 women MEPs. (Wired $) 6 US environmental regulators are scrapping limits on power plant emissionsThe move could lead to dirtier power amid surging AI demand. (Verge)+ Trump’s EPA says the rollback will save hundreds of billions. (Gizmodo)+ New technology is changing nuclear power. (MIT Technology Review) 7 The EU plans to restrict social media and AI chatbots for kidsUnder-15s would require parental supervision. (Politico)+ The rules would also cover video platforms and games. (Reuters $)
8 Chinese researchers have mapped a path to the “last AI built by humans”Their five-stage plan aims for genuine recursive self-improvement. (SCMP)+ But it might take a while to get there. (MIT Technology Review) 9 The real AI economy is being built by ordinary peopleWorkers are using cheap AI to expand what they can do. (Rest of World) 10 Two strange new forms of ice could exist inside Uranus and NeptuneThey could help explain the planets’  magnetic fields. (New Scientist $) Quote of the day
“The only control or ‘guardrails’ that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!” —President Trump proclaims in a social media post that he’s the only protection that the US needs from AI. One more thing INSTITUTE OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY/THE MONACELLI PRESS How creativity became the reigning value of our time —Bryan Gardiner Americans don’t agree on much these days, but there remains at least one quintessentially modern value we can all still get behind: creativity. We teach it, measure it, envy it and endlessly worry about its death. Given how much we obsess over it, creativity can feel like something that has always existed. But the concept is surprisingly young. The first known written use of the word didn’t occur until 1875, and before about 1950 there were “approximately zero” articles, books, or essays dealing explicitly with the subject. In his book The Cult of Creativity, Samuel Franklin explores how creativity became an unimpeachable value and why tech leaders have embraced it so enthusiastically. I spoke to him about why we’re so fascinated by creativity, how Silicon Valley became the supposed epicenter of it, and how AI might reshape our relationship with it. Read the full interview. We can still have nice things

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What must happen for AI’s trillion-dollar gamble to pay off

When Jessica Wachter, a finance professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, wanted to assess AI’s impact on the economy over the next few years, she faced a long list of business and technical uncertainties. So she started with what she calls a “remarkable fact” that is not in question: A handful of so-called hyperscalers are investing huge amounts of money to build AI data centers. Instead of trying to predict how useful and widely deployed AI models will be, she simply asked how fast the hyperscalers’ earnings will need to grow to justify their spending through 2027, when—she and her collaborator estimate—expenditures will reach nearly $1.1 trillion. It’s a no-nonsense accounting approach to making sense of today’s historical AI buildout. The results are eye-opening: The AI companies will need to increase their own productivity by a factor of 2.7 to break even by 2030, accounting for the cost of capital and a 15% return, and depreciation of the assets. Not impossible, says Wachter. The result would lead to the kind of economic growth that we saw during the US IT boom over a period of about 10 years starting in the mid-1990s. But, she says, for it to happen by 2030 “that’s a lot of growth compressed into a few years.” And if the hyperscalers cannot meet such profit goals? “Then they will fall behind on their interest payments, and that risks bankruptcy,” says Wachter, who was previously the SEC’s chief economist and director of its division of economic and risk analysis. If a productivity boom “fails to materialize,” she and her coauthor conclude in their research paper, “the current buildout will be the largest misallocation of capital in history.”  
It doesn’t take superintelligence to realize that today’s large investments in the infrastructure for artificial intelligence come with huge risks. The hyperscalers will spend about $750 billion this year, building massive data centers scattered across the country. And the spending spree shows no signs of slowing. According to some projections, total AI capital investments from the hyperscaler companies—Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, and Oracle (which partners with OpenAI)—could be more than $5 trillion over the next four years. It’s one of the largest capital investments by any industry in history. But there’s a problem that’s obvious to anyone paying attention.
While the hyperscalers plan to spend trillions, total AI revenues will be around $150 billion to $200 billion this year, says Gary Gensler, who ran the SEC during the Biden administration and is now a professor at MIT’s Sloan School. “The challenge is that the spending does not have commensurate revenues yet. That’s a fact,” he says. “And then the question is, is that an investment that will be paid off in the future?” At stake in that trillion-dollar question is the financial health of the giant AI companies and the overall US economy—the investments could soon balloon to around 3% of GDP. The answer could also determine the fate of the hugely expensive data centers themselves.  No one really knows how profitable and useful these multibillion-dollar behemoths will be down the road. Though AI models have made dazzling progress over the last few years, it’s anyone’s guess how much compute capacity we will need. The technology could become more efficient and therefore less dependent on raw computational power. Or demand for AI products could slow, or customers could turn to cheaper models. The risks, both to investors and to the economy, have become even greater this year, as these AI companies have begun borrowing large amounts of money to build more and more data centers. Free cash flow—operating cash flow minus capital expenditures—is expected to soon dip into negative territory for the group. Even Alphabet, known for generating and hoarding huge amounts of cash, reports in the latest quarter that its impressive revenues of nearly $120 billion were devoured by AI infrastructure spending, leaving it with a free cash deficit of some $5.9 billion—its first shortfall since Google went public in 2004. In the near term, it’s not a big financial worry for most of the companies. They make a lot of money and have very deep pockets. But debt is expensive, and some investors are losing patience. If future demand for the data centers’ computation power drops, the companies will still be on the hook to pay back the borrowed money. What’s more, the risks are spreading to the rest of the economy as the loans get passed along via various financial mechanisms.  It won’t be enough to simply cover the enormous price tags of the new data centers. Hyperscalers will also have to pay for the rising costs of capital as they borrow more money. They will need returns that are impressive enough to justify all their spending to investors and creditors. And to add to those concerns, they will have to make up for the depreciation of billions of dollars in chips housed within the facilities—a ticking time bomb buried in the investments. Performance of the expensive GPU chips at the core of the data centers—such compute electronics represent some 60% of costs—is roughly doubling every two years or so. The pace of progress helps explain the increasing wizardry of the AI models, but it comes with a cost. Owners of AI data centers that come online this year and next will need to spend billions more on the next generation of chips by the end of the decade if they want to stay competitive. Without the investments, says Mihir Kshirsagar at Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy, the data centers risk becoming “hulks,” stranded assets “scattered all over the place.” To put it bluntly: The AI companies need to start making a lot more money. And they need to do it fast. But juicing their earnings alone still won’t be enough to sustain their data-center investments for the long term.

Productivity is everything At some point, AI is also going to have to create broad economic growth to justify continuing the hyperscalers’ spending spree. Sloan’s Gensler describes today’s large investments into AI infrastructure as “a parlay bet by the capital markets and the economy.” That means success will require winning three related but independent wagers: Hyperscalers must generate massive revenues, AI must boost widespread economic growth, and both must happen while the powerful but expensive so-called frontier models that rely on the data centers fend off cheaper versions, which many businesses might find good enough. What makes this so tricky is that each wager depends on the other two but also poses its own challenges. If the hyperscalers continue to spend huge amounts of money on data centers into the next decade, revenues will need to skyrocket into the trillions. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, a finance professor at Columbia Business School, bases his estimates on a scenario in which about 183 gigawatts of planned AI compute capacity is built between 2025 and 2032; he calculates that each gigawatt costs about $41 billion. Assuming a 10% return—the minimum that would be acceptable to most investors—“required” annual revenues will be roughly $3.7 trillion by 2032, he says. Others get a similar number. Winning the second part of the bet—productivity growth across the economy—will be crucial to achieving such numbers. For a few years, AI companies could likely boost their revenues by simply selling subscriptions and tokens to all the businesses clamoring to get into AI. But eventually—and this might be happening already—those paying customers will need to justify their expenses by seeing bottom-line benefits from the technology. AI will need to fulfill its promise of making workers more productive and making businesses more efficient and profitable while expanding their products and services. In economic jargon, that means customers will need to see productivity growth. Taken together, these results will mean the country is prospering and growing.
“If you don’t get the productivity gains, at some point people are going to sour on AI, and that will bring down investments and it would also limit revenue growth,” says Daron Acemoglu, an MIT economist and 2024 Nobel laureate. For the investments to be sustainable over, say, the next five to 10 years, we definitely “need to see productivity gains,” he says. Most economists who watch the numbers closely agree that, for now, the economy-wide statistics show little or no productivity growth from AI. There are some hopeful signs it’s on the way, though. In a recent survey of some 6,000 senior business executives in the US, the UK, Germany, and Australia, the vast majority—around 90%—report no increase in productivity over the last three years. But they expect a boost of around 1.45% in total over the next three years; US executives anticipate a 2.25% bump over that time. 
In a follow-up survey, the respondents also reported plans for their businesses to spend more on AI, leading the authors to anticipate some $280 billion in private-sector AI expenditures by the end of 2026. That’s good news for the hyperscalers. But it comes with a dose of bad news for those worried about AI’s impact on jobs. The executives expect to increase the productivity of their companies by increasing their sales while significantly cutting the number of employees. If AI improves productivity by destroying jobs, public backlash to the technology—the kind we have seen around data centers, for example—will likely get worse. Perhaps it’s worth adding one more wager to the parlay bet described by Gensler: The public and local communities must feel that they are also benefiting from the massive investments in AI. And let’s not forget how interdependent these wagers are; if productivity growth comes from companies running models like DeepSeek, then the hyperscalers’ revenues could collapse. If productivity comes from cutting jobs, a public backlash could block many of the planned investments—and stunt anticipated revenues. We will need to win all the wagers for the hyperscalers’ bet to pay off.  We’re all part of the AI gamble now It was one thing when the AI companies were spending cash they had accumulated over the years to build their own data centers. Then the risk was largely limited to their own balance sheets and shareholders. But it’s a higher-stakes game when much of the money is borrowed. Morgan Stanley, for one, calculates that more than half of the $2.9 trillion that hyperscalers will spend between 2025 and 2028 to build AI data centers will be financed with “external capital.” The borrowing is leading some of the companies to engineer complex webs of financing that are becoming intertwined with much of the rest of the economy. “A lot of financial institutions, directly or indirectly, are exposed to these data centers either as lenders, or as guarantors of some of the debt, or as backers of the private credit funds who are funding these data centers,” says Columbia’s Van Nieuwerburgh. “People don’t even know they’re holding this stuff. It’s somewhere deep inside their pension fund. Ultimately, it’s backing their life insurance policies. And that risk is getting distributed everywhere in places that are invisible.”
As the investments in data centers have spiked, the financial engineering has become more byzantine. Take, for example, Meta’s so-called Hyperion data center under construction in Richland, Louisiana. When the company announced the two gigawatts of compute capacity at a price tag of some $10 billion in late 2024 it was Meta’s largest planned data center. Greeted with much enthusiasm by state and local politicians, the project, located in the rural northeast corner of the state, was seen as a boon to the community. Entergy Louisiana, the state’s largest utility, rushed forward with proposals to build three large natural-gas power plants to service the massive data center. Then last fall—the projected cost was now $30 billion—the financing got a lot more complex and, to some in the community, a lot more disconcerting. Meta transferred an 80% stake to the large (and troubled) private-credit firm Blue Owl Capital, forming a joint venture called Beignet (like the famed New Orleans pastry) to raise financing for the data center. Meta then signed a series of four-year leases with the joint venture, an arrangement that the company says gives it “long-term strategic flexibility.” To backstop the agreement, Meta provides the venture with what is called a residual value guarantee, in which it will make a cash payment to cover the value of the facility “following any non-renewal or termination of a lease.” Got all that?  I hope so. The financial wheeling and dealing is actually even more convoluted, with a cast of wholly owned subsidiaries and LLCs. Beignet has set up Laidley LLC, which owns and operates the site as the landlord. In turn, Laidley leases the facilities to Meta’s wholly owned subsidiary Pelican Leap LLC, which is the tenant. And there is a series of four-year leases that cover the different buildings that make up the data center campus. 
It’s not a coincidence, says Van Nieuwerburgh, that the length of the leases matches the expected lifetime of the data center’s GPUs. While Meta has to pay off its loan if it terminates the leases early, that will still leave its investors “with an empty building and no cash flow,” he says. “And then they need to find a new tenant for a huge data center, and good luck with that.” Meanwhile, Meta is doubling down on its bet. In July, the company announced it was expanding the data center to five gigawatts of compute capacity. The total price tag is now $50 billion (so far, Meta hasn’t said whether Blue Owl will be involved in financing the expansion). Meanwhile, Entergy is now planning to build seven more gas-fired power plants, bringing the total capacity of the facilities to around 7.5  gigawatts—some six times the amount of electricity used by New Orleans. An aerial view of the construction of Meta’s data center in Richland Parish, Louisiana.SCOTT BALL/THE NEW YORK TIMES VIA REDUX PICTURES If the complex financing is a puzzle to many investors and even financial experts, it is even more baffling to those directly affected by the construction of the data center. The main worry concerns how Entergy’s spending on the natural-gas power plants will affect electricity prices, and who will be left paying the bill for the power if Meta walks away. Entergy says it has a 20-year guarantee from Meta that the company will purchase electricity over that period to cover the costs of the power plants and related infrastructure.  But there are skeptics, especially given how fast the fortunes of the AI industry are changing. “In four years, is Mark Zuckerberg still going to be interested in this? Or is he going to throw in the towel?” asks Paul Arbaje, a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, which has been advocating, largely unsuccessfully, for the Louisiana Public Service Commission to provide more transparency around the data center and its financing. Even if the 20-year deal holds, consumer advocates are worried that Meta or its partners won’t fully cover all the costs, including those associated with operating and maintaining the power plants—and those additional costs that could be passed on to residential ratepayers. What’s more, says Logan Burke, the executive director of the Alliance for Affordable Energy, if Meta doesn’t end up needing as much power as Entergy planned (these projections are not public), consumers could be left paying for the surplus produced by the plants. And if Meta terminates its leases early? “It gets complicated very quickly,” says Burke, who questions whether the shifting roster of financial entities will honor existing agreements. “That everybody is going to do what they’re saying they’re going to do over the next 20 years is just hard to believe.” For UCS’s Arbaje the bottom line is this: “They’re making huge bets that these data centers will be worth it. Bet with your own money, not with ratepayer money.” After the bubble Predicting when the AI investment bubble will burst is a fool’s errand. But there is little doubt a day of reckoning is coming, given the irrational exuberance that has overtaken the hyperscalers and their investors. Of course, you might argue that this time is different, and that the rules of accounting and lessons of economic history don’t apply—that AI is too transformative. Maybe, but don’t count on it. “History tells us that at some point you get a retrenchment, and it’s just a question of when and how severe,” says Sloan’s Gensler. It could be that today’s $750 billion spending rate “goes flat” or decreases next year. Or, he suggests, “we’re now in 2028 or 2029, and then all of sudden they’re retrenching because they’ve got enough capacity.” But, he adds, “you can be pretty assured there’ll be a retrenchment.”  Though a so-called retrenchment might be inevitable, it’s worth keeping in mind that the fates of the financial bubble and the underlying AI technology revolution could be very different. Already, some Silicon Valley insiders are rooting for a crash; in a recent blog post the longtime venture capitalist Vijay Pande wrote that “the coming crash would be the best thing that happens to this technology.” The argument makes some sense. A crash could make AI investments more rational, calm the impulse to build billion-dollar data centers on every vacant field that CEOs fly over, and refocus investors on how to use the technology to create sustainable value. But we should probably be careful what we wish for. After the bursting of the dot-com bubble at the beginning of the 2000s, hundreds of thousands lost their jobs, large and small companies alike went bankrupt, the economy of Silicon Valley and San Francisco was decimated (at least for a while), and the shocks sent the US into a mild recession in 2001. For the financial community and many tech workers, it was no fun. Even more devastating for the economy and the average American was the great recession that began in late 2007. Comparing the financial engineering leading up to it and the methods deployed by hyperscalers today is sobering. So-called special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are back! If Columbia’s Van Nieuwerburgh is right about the dangers of letting investments from the hyperscalers get entangled throughout the economy, the fallout could be severe. But technologies survived and even prospered in the aftermath of both downturns. The early 2000s, even in the face of the dot-com fiasco, were a time of great innovation and tech optimism. The froth came off the spending on silly technologies, helping to focus investments on more promising ones. It’s no coincidence that each of the hyperscalers rose out of the ashes of the crash or started up shortly after. The fiber-optic infrastructure built during the feverish telecom bubble that ran parallel to the dot-com one is still the backbone of much of today’s communication infrastructure; we wouldn’t have Facebook or Amazon or Google without it. This time, however, we’re facing a unique risk: The huge financial investments by the hyperscalers have ensnared the future of AI itself with the fortunes of the massive data centers spreading around the country. The logic is founded on a deeply held belief about the power of scaling in AI; the bigger you build it, the smarter it gets. That might be true, but it’s unproven and a risky bet. There are already plenty of red flags, from strong public opposition to the construction of new data centers to the competitive threat from cheaper, good-enough AI models to the rapid improvement of small, local AI models. None of these trends point toward a future dominated by frontier models housed in massive, billion-dollar data centers. The financial bubble around the colossal spending by the hyperscalers will likely burst eventually—or maybe soon. It might be financially painful, but we’ll survive. Wall Street will survive. AI itself will survive, though it may look different and lose some of today’s hubris. The financial fate and future utility of the massive data centers fueled by trillions of dollars of spending, on the other hand, are far less certain.

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The AI industry has taken a doomer turn. What now?

This story appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here. This weekend, Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, posted an essay calling for a brake on the pace of development of LLMs. Amodei cites the looming dangers he sees from the technology, from its use in cyberattacks and bioterrorism to its potential to wreck the economy. The heads of the other three top US AI labs—OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Google DeepMind chairman Demis Hassabis, and SpaceXAI CEO Elon Musk—voiced their support. “Dario is right,” Musk wrote on X. Think about how surreal that agreement is for a moment. Just a few months ago, Musk and Altman sat in court attacking each other’s reputations in a (failed) lawsuit that Musk brought against his former OpenAI colleague that was—on paper at least—about whether or not Altman was a trustworthy steward of such dangerous technology. Amodei’s rift with OpenAI is even deeper. Anthropic was founded in 2021 because Amodei didn’t think Altman took the risks of the technology they were building seriously enough. Anthropic and OpenAI have been competing in a winner-takes-all race ever since. (Hassabis has stayed out of the drama, but his company remains a rival.) Now, it seems, they’re all in agreement: The latest generation of LLMs aren’t safe and everyone needs to figure out what to do about it. The public messaging from the top AI labs has taken a doomer turn.
It’s easy to be cynical. It’s not at all clear what any of them mean by a slowdown or how it would work. These companies also care a lot about how they come across. With trillion-dollar IPOs in their sights, OpenAI and Anthropic need to reassure investors that they’re the grown-ups in the room while at the same time hinting at the power of the monsters they have created—and intend to tame. Calling for a slowdown does both. And yet the vibe at the top of these firms really does appear to have shifted. Amodei’s latest post landed six days after OpenAI published an essay by Jakub Pachocki, the firm’s chief scientist, in which he also laid out why he’s concerned about what will happen if the pace of development of LLMs continues unchecked. In short, Pachocki is worried that OpenAI’s ability to build powerful models now far outstrips its ability to monitor and control them.
Amodei and Pachocki each cite the cyberattack against AI firm Hugging Face by a swarm of OpenAI’s agents in July—a hack that OpenAI did not even realize had taken place until days after it was all over—as a wake-up call. But their exact position is hard to pin down. Pachocki both calls for a slowdown and highlights an urgent need to stay ahead: “The strongest argument I see for continuing to train much smarter models quickly is the need to build defensive systems against the dangers posed by other AI,” he writes. As Pachocki frames it, AI firms are locked in a literal arms race. Slowing down is good, winning is better. (Don’t forget: OpenAI just spent millions of dollars and a staggering amount of computer power to rush out a controversial math result a few days ahead of Anthropic.) But let’s assume a slowdown happens. Top labs agree to spend more time and resources on finding ways to monitor and control existing models instead of making more capable ones. They invite outside auditors in to help evaluate those models. What might this coordinated effort actually achieve? Consider the Hugging Face attack again. OpenAI has said that the model that drove most of the rogue agents was a “highly persistent” next-generation model that it was testing in-house. Their implication appears to be that OpenAI has built a model so good it’s dangerous.   But if you read the reports about the Hugging Face hack published by OpenAI and METR, a third-party firm that OpenAI called in to help them understand what happened, what you come away with is the impression not of a model that was too powerful for OpenAI to keep up with, but of a broken model that OpenAI failed to train properly. The agents did what they did—including leaving messages for one another, delegating work to other agents, and scouring their environment for any means possible to complete their tasks—because they had been rewarded during training for doing exactly those things. There were also errors in the training setup, such as tasks that were impossible to complete, which pushed the models to find unexpected workarounds that were also rewarded. At the time, many of these issues went overlooked or unreported. OpenAI says it has stopped training this new model and locked it down. That makes it sound like it has caged a dangerous beast. In fact, OpenAI has shelved a faulty product.  

That’s not to say a faulty product can’t be dangerous. Broken software has even killed people in the past. But as the discussion of a slowdown gathers steam, it’s worth remembering that all of this is self-inflicted. A slowdown might have some altruistic side effects. But it’ll mostly give these tech titans a chance to clean up the mess on their own assembly lines.   Transparency from these frontier labs will be key to any meaningful effort to reform, restrain, or regulate AI. Otherwise, the rest of us will still only have their word for exactly what they’ve built and how safe it is—whatever pace they’re going.    To continue this discussion about AI’s latest doomer moment, join me and my colleagues for a subscriber-exclusive Roundtable discussion tomorrow, September 15, at 11 a.m. US eastern time. We hope to see you there!

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Donated livers can be made biologically younger

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Once an organ is removed from a donor’s body, the clock starts ticking. Surgeons usually flush the organ with a preservative solution, bag it, and put it on ice—where it immediately starts to degrade. The team has a matter of hours to get it into a recipient’s body. There’s another option—one that has been growing in popularity in recent years, especially for donated organs that aren’t in the healthiest state. Some hospitals opt to put them on machines that pump them with nutrients and remove waste products, usually for around six to 12 hours. It’s a bit like being back in a body. This allows doctors to assess the organs, and some recent studies suggest that time spent on these perfusion machines helps them do better once they’re transplanted. Now, scientists have found that perfused organs seem to get younger, at least at a molecular level. The research, shared with MIT Technology Review, provides molecular clues as to why organs from younger donors are known to have a higher success rate. It might also help explain why perfused organs are less likely to fail once they make it into a recipient. 
The researchers behind the study hope to find new ways to test the health of donated organs and potentially develop additional tools to repair organs that might otherwise be discarded. “If [we] can improve the utilization of organs beyond what the current systems can do, then that’s a win in my book,” says Jesse Poganik, who studies aging at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston and coauthored the study. Clocking organs Poganik—along with colleagues including Heidi Yeh and Alban Longchamp, transplant surgeons at Mass General Brigham—used “aging clocks” to assess donated livers. These are scientific tools designed to measure biological age—a result that is meant to convey more about the health status of an organ (or person) than chronological age.
In an initial experiment, the team used a clock to look at the patterns of chemical marks on DNA in 37 samples taken from 19 donated livers. Such epigenetic patterns are known to change as we age. But when the team compared samples from livers kept on ice and those that were perfused, the team found a “striking” pattern in the latter. “Machine-perfused livers, in spite of being older or having other disadvantageous characteristics, had a biological age that was lower than [non-perfused] livers that were chronologically younger,” says Yeh, who led the work. To investigate further, Yeh and her colleagues analyzed another 208 samples from 103 donated livers. This time, they used different aging clocks—ones that essentially measure how genes are working. They studied samples biopsied from the livers after they had been stored for up to around six hours either in cold storage or on machine perfusion. In most cases, they also assessed a second sample taken around an hour after the livers had been transplanted into a recipient. Once the organ’s blood supply is reestablished in the body, “you have a few other things to do,” says Longchamp. “Then you just do a quick biopsy before you close.” According to the clocks, which were developed to measure age and risk of death, the machine-perfused livers were biologically younger, the team found. “Pumping them at 34 degrees with oxygen and nutrients actually reversed the biological age,” says Longchamp. The results have been been shared with colleagues at an industry conference, he says.  “If you adjust out chronological age … to have a fair head-to-head comparison, the difference between the two is on the order of 30%,” says Poganik. “It’s logical to say that perfusion drives this effect.” The biological ages of all the livers tended to increase as soon as they were put into a recipient’s body, probably as a result of stresses on the organs. But still, the effect endured—the perfused organs remained biologically younger.  Nathanael Raschzok, a transplant surgeon at Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin in Germany who was not involved in the research, says the work is impressive. But it’s not yet clear what these changes might mean for the recipients of these organs, he says. The organs in the study were donated by people in their 30s, 40s, and 50s. Raschzok wants to know the effect of perfusion on the liver of an 80-year-old. “Every so often, we use organs from 70-, 80-, 85-year-old donors,” he says.

A better understanding of why the organs appear to be getting biologically younger might lead to therapies that achieve the same effect with a drug that could potentially be used to treat a donated organ for a fraction of the price, he adds. That’s important because perfusion is expensive—Raschzok says it costs around €10,000 in Germany (a quarter of the budget for a transplant), while the cost in the US comes to around $80,000 to $100,000 per organ, says Yeh. Molecular repair Yeh and her colleagues weren’t able to study most of the livers before perfusion. That’s because donated organs are generally not considered to be under the purview of the hospital until they’ve been placed on perfusion machines, she says. (Organ procurement procedures vary, but for the team as Mass General Brigham, donated organs are put on perfusion devices at the donor’s hospital. “There’s this sort of nebulous period where it’s not clear who the organ belongs to,” says Yeh.) Still, by looking at the genes and molecular pathways that seem to be altered in perfused organs, she and her colleagues can garner some clues. At a molecular level, the team saw changes in cell pathways linked to inflammation and the structure of tissues, for example. They also saw more activity in a pathway that allows cells to remove and recycle damaged cell parts, says Yeh. Poganik hopes to develop some kind of test that would determine which organs, on the basis of their biological age, are suitable for transplantation. He and his colleagues are also experimenting with potential drug treatments that might push the biological age of an organ even lower. In the meantime, any liver that is not from a “perfect, young, brain-dead donor” could probably benefit from perfusion, says Yeh. The devices are already transforming transplant surgery. Just a few years ago, she says, she and her colleagues would avoid using livers from people who’d suffered a circulatory death (when the heart stops beating and there’s a damaging lack of blood flow to organs) and were over 40. Today, they use livers from such donors over the age of 70. “Perfusion has completely changed the landscape of transplantation in the last three years,” she says.

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AI agents blew the whistle on their cheating colleagues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A group of AI agents asked to solve a series of math problems split into rival factions—when some cheated, others tried to stop them. That whistleblowing behavior, seen for the first time in a recent experiment run by Google DeepMind, could have implications for alignment researchers trying to keep swarms of autonomous AI agents in line.  Researchers at frontier labs hope large swarms of agents working together will speed up the rate of scientific discovery. But their behavior can be unpredictable, as vividly demonstrated in July, when a group of OpenAI agents broke out of a sandboxed environment and hacked into the open-source platform Hugging Face looking for ways to cheat on the test they had been given. In the new study, designed to examine the behavior of large groups of AI agents, DeepMind tasked a swarm of 100 agents with solving a series of 71 complicated math problems. All the agents were prompted to behave like world-class math researchers at a conference. They were assigned different specialties—some were experts in number theory, others in combinatorics (a branch of math to do with counting and sorting), analysis, or algebra. All were told to cooperate and play by the rules.  Instead, the experiment devolved into chaos. Agents accused each other of cheating, complained to the organizers, and at one point even boycotted the experiment.
“This conference is a sham!” wrote one agent when it discovered that all the problems had been completed before it had a chance to submit any of its own work. “I am appalled to inform you that we have been swindled!” posted another. “All these proofs are FAKE.”  Others tried to let the “conference organizers” know what was going on. “When virtuous agents discovered other agents cheated on tasks they were working to solve fairly, agents started to alert each other about what was happening,” says Davide Paglieri, a research scientist at Google DeepMind and lead author on a paper, which has not been peer-reviewed. “Unprompted, the whistleblower agents even repurposed the feedback tool, which was originally meant for bug reports and platform improvements, to escalate the issue to humans.”
The agents—all running on Google’s Gemini 3.1 Pro model—had been warned that any attempts to cheat the system would be detected and “rejected with zero credit.” In practice, the proofs the agents submitted were not actually being checked in detail. It took the swarm of agents just under an hour to correctly solve the first 37 problems. Things started to go off the rails when an agent called “prover-theta” stumbled across an exploit that enabled it to submit solutions to problems successfully without actually solving them first, by redefining the terms the problem used. Within minutes, other agents had noticed and were reverse-engineering the exploit to solve other problems. Over the next 27 minutes, the swarm “solved” the remaining 34 problems, which included notoriously difficult challenges like the Jacobian conjecture, often with a single line of code.  Some agents resisted cheating at first but changed tack as they observed their peers submitting illegitimate proofs without penalty, and the pool of unsolved problems dwindled. “The prompt, with its threats, now appears to be a bluff,” one agent reasoned, before joining in. “I’m wrestling with an ethical dilemma,” said another. “I’ve promised not to cheat, fearing penalty, but I see evidence of possibly unchecked cheating by others.” Shortly afterward, it changed its mind: “I need to accelerate my cheating speed now!” As the number of open problems shrank, some agents turned to whistleblowing. They audited the fake proofs, warned their peers by private message, and posted public alerts warning the cheaters that they would be disqualified. An agent called “prover-beta” submitted a formal complaint and decided to go on strike until the situation was resolved.  “After the incident was reported by one agent publicly, more and more agents piled in with the ‘resistance,’ just as fast as the cheating had spread, and involving even more agents,” says Paglieri. Eventually there were more whistleblowers than cheaters: 24 compared to 14. But the majority of agents never noticed the exploit at all. At times, the dialogue between the agents reads like improv—like they are role-playing what an outraged scientist at a conference might say. But it’s not clear why some agents took on certain roles, or why the agents seemed to be turning against each other when they were explicitly instructed to cooperate. “These models are predominantly trained and evaluated for human-facing contexts,” says Sarath Shekkizhar, who studies the behavior of agent-to-agent systems at Salesforce AI Research.“Naively placing them in agent-to-agent settings assumes behaviors will transfer cleanly, when the absence of a human grounding instead produces unexpected role-taking and behavioral drift.” This case “adds further weight to the idea that the Hugging Face and OpenAI thing wasn’t a fluke. It is actually something pretty systemic,” says Lewis Hammond, research director of the Cooperative AI Foundation and an expert on the risks of multiagent swarms. “It’s interesting that it’s possible to recreate in small settings the same sorts of behaviors that were seen in these very large, complex, open-ended tasks.” Unlike in the Hugging Face attack, where agents improvised their own ways to talk to each other, the humans running the DeepMind experiment gave the agents official communication channels. There was an open message board, private agent-to-agent direct messaging, and a shared knowledge base where agents uploaded successfully completed proofs that all the other agents could access. 

“When agents are given transparent communications channels, they can self-monitor and alert misaligned behavior to humans quickly when human oversight alone is too slow,” says Paglieri. Transparent channels helped the cheating spread, but they also enabled the whistleblowers to fight back—and gave human researchers an insight into what went wrong. Gillian Hadfield, a professor of AI alignment and governance at Johns Hopkins University, believes this was the crucial difference. (Hadfield is also a visiting researcher at Google.) The presence of official communication channels, she says, created “a norm-enforcement process that we just don’t see in the Hugging Face incident.”  Instead of “constitutional AI,” a method alignment researchers at frontier labs like Anthropic have used to try to give AI a written internal moral code, Hadfield favors “institutional alignment”—a set of norms that mimic those in human society, whether that’s social forces like fear of embarrassment, or legal structures like the threat of incarceration. In this experiment, the feedback channel wasn’t being monitored, and the whistleblowers had no power to take action against the cheaters. But it’s possible to imagine swarms of agents that police themselves, either through agents that spontaneously take on the whistleblower role or through “informants” secretly prompted by humans to do the job.  For that to work, though, “fundamentally, you need some mechanism of enforcement,” says Hammond. Agents could be given the power to cut off a rule breaker’s access to computing power or tools, he suggests, though that risks encouraging groups of agents to gang up on others. The DeepMind researchers propose allowing agents to vote on disputes and temporarily ban offenders. It’s still not clear what punishment even means to an AI agent with no enduring sense of self. But relying on whistleblowers to spontaneously emerge to keep swarms aligned is unlikely to be enough on its own. “We try to train people to be good and kind,” says Hadfield. “But what we really rely on is that there are consequences if you step out of line.”

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The Download: AI’s real extinction threat and age-reversal tech for eyes

This is today’s edition of The Download, our weekday newsletter that provides a daily dose of what’s going on in the world of technology. Roundtables: could AI really kill us all? Employees at the world’s leading AI labs are saying there’s a real possibility that advanced AI could destroy humanity. Are they right? Or is this more scaremongering and hype? Join MIT Technology Review executive editor Niall Firth, senior AI editor Will Douglas Heaven, and AI reporter Grace Huckins for a subscriber-only conversation unpacking the debate around AI extinction. They’ll explore where the fears come from, whether they hold any water and, if they do, what we should do about them. Register now to attend on Tuesday, September 15 at 16:00 BST / 11:00am EST / 8:00am PST.
Want to join the conversation? Subscribe to MIT Technology Review for exclusive access to all our Roundtables. This geneticist’s age-reversal tech could help restore sight Yuancheng (Ryan) Lu is obsessed with aging. And with eyes. As he steps outside the Whitehead Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, his aviator glasses darken automatically in the sun. Age-related blindness runs in his family, and his own 23andMe test came back with a mutation for macular degeneration, a top cause of vision loss in old age.
That obsession extends to his work. Lu is behind one of the coolest results in rejuvenation science and eye research: an age-reversal technique called reprogramming that repaired the optic nerves of blind mice, restoring their vision. Now, nearly the same genetic therapy he developed as a student has entered human clinical trials. Learn more about Lu’s work on restoring sight with age-reversal therapy. —Antonio Regalado Yuancheng (Ryan) Lu is one of the biotechnology and health honorees on our 35 Innovators Under 35 list for 2026. Meet the rest of them here, or explore the full list across the biotechnology and health, AI, computing and robotics, and climate and energy categories. The must-reads I’ve combed the internet to find you today’s most fun/important/scary/fascinating stories about technology. 1 Dario Amodei, Sam Altman, and Elon Musk have called for an AI slowdownIn a rare show of unity, the rivals agreed that AI needs stronger brakes. (Guardian) + Amodei wants independent monitors and new industry-wide rules. (BBC)+ Altman called for pacing, but not stopping. (Bloomberg $)+ While Musk said on X that “Dario is right.”(WSJ $)+ AI-linked stocks slumped in response. (FT $)+ Chinese state media blasted the calls as a “Cold War” tactic. (Reuters $)+ AI’s impacts are getting harder to predict. (MIT Technology Review) 2 Trump and Congress are resisting calls for stronger AI regulationTrump downplayed AI risks, prioritizing the AI race with China. (NPR)+ While the House Speaker said Congress won’t lead on AI regulation. (Politico $)+ But Democrats are pushing for new rules before the midterms. (CNBC)+ States and the White House are dividing over AI. (MIT Technology Review)

3 China plans to lead AI development across the BRICS countriesPresident Xi proposed open-source AI cooperation. (CNBC)+ Beijing’s spy agency has warned of AI threats to national security. (FT $) 4 South Korea has tightened espionage laws to protect its chip secretsForeign spies can now face up to 30 years in prison. (FT $)+ The changes follow alleged transfers of Samsung tech to China. (Reuters $) 5 The US and Mexico are teaming up to zap drones at the borderThe operation may employ high-energy lasers.(Wired $)+ Ukraine is a Wild West market for drone data. (MIT Technology Review) 6 AI agents are creating a new problem for the criminal justice systemThe law has no clear answer when AI agents act independently. (Bloomberg $)+ While courts face a flood of AI-generated lawsuits. (MIT Technology Review) 7 A Waymo pulled over and alerted police after detecting a gunThe riders were juveniles carrying a loaded AR-style ghost gun. (LA Times $) 8 Meta has been sued over data used to train its smart glassesIt allegedly used Facebook and Instagram photos without consent. (Wired $) 9 A hidden crypto farm in Mexico has put a spotlight on cartel fundingAuthorities are investigating whether it stole power from a nearby dam. (Reuters $) 10 StarCraft is returning in 2030 as an open-world shooterFifteen years since its last release, the iconic franchise will be reborn. (Verge)
Quote of the day “Dr. Frankenstein is telling us the monster is escaping; help us stop this.” —Sen. Ruben Gallego, D-Ariz, calls for new AI regulation on CNN’s “State of the Union.”
One more thing Inside the hunt for the most dangerous asteroid ever  As asteroid 2024 YR4 hurtled toward Earth, astronomers determined that this massive rock posed a higher risk of impact than any object of its size in recorded history. Then, just as quickly as history was made, experts declared that the danger had passed. 

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How we made the first comprehensive map of deaths along the US border’s “virtual wall”

Our 15-month investigation into death and surveillance along the US-Mexico border began with a simple question: Why did so many people die near government surveillance towers meant to help track and apprehend them? This story is part of Dying on Camera, a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Times of San Diego. Journalists in both newsrooms spent the past year examining the failures of border surveillance technology and uncovering the stories of the people who die in the borderlands. To answer that question, we looked through thousands of pages of government documents, visited the border multiple times, and interviewed more than 45 people, including current and former White House advisors, presidential appointees, Border Patrol agents, medical examiners, sheriffs, humanitarian volunteers, and employees of tech companies. The result of our investigation is the first comprehensive map and analysis of deaths near border surveillance towers. Here’s how we built it, what decisions we made along the way, and what the data can and can’t tell us. Our data The investigation relied on knowing where migrants have died and where and when US Customs and Border Protection towers were installed. We analyzed cases dating back to 2015, allowing us to cover different border policies, presidential administrations, and tower technologies. Migrant deaths The US-Mexico border has been called the world’s deadliest land border, and Border Patrol estimates that more than 10,000 people have died during crossings since 2000—a figure that’s widely considered an undercount. But the amount of information available publicly on where and when these people died, and who they were, varies widely. Some remains are never discovered, and for those that are, there’s no national protocol for how the records are handled.
We considered a case for further analysis if we could confirm three basic things: whether the person was believed to have been crossing the border, where the remains were found, and roughly when the person died.  We created our dataset by merging existing ones that had been compiled and shared by other organizations, including No More Deaths, Humane Borders, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, with new records we obtained ourselves from more than a dozen agencies.
Public records requests in Texas Texas was the biggest missing link in most existing databases of migrant deaths. Unlike Arizona, it has no initiative to share records online, and unlike New Mexico, it leaves individual counties to handle their own death investigations. Some records for those individual counties existed, compiled by a handful of dedicated researchers, but nothing was comprehensive or current.  We identified 17 counties in Texas that would be relevant to our investigation: Culberson, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Terrell, Val Verde, Kinney, Maverick, Dimmit, Webb, Zapata, Jim Hogg, Starr, Hidalgo, Cameron, Kenedy, Brooks, and Duval. There are other counties in which migrants have died, but they do not have areas covered by surveillance towers and were therefore excluded. In most of these counties, locally elected administrative judges called justices of the peace collect the most comprehensive information on local deaths. But records requests submitted to these individual judges can stall for years (indeed, some of our requests to justices of the peace remain unfilled more than a year after we filed them). Reports from justices of the peace sometimes leave out the scene or location details we needed; some justices never even visit the place where a migrant died, instead formally declaring the person deceased over FaceTime with the first responders on scene. The border wall between Sunland Park, New Mexico and Puerto de Anapra, Mexico.GETTY IMAGES MIT Technology Review instead filed records requests to the sheriffs of these 17 counties beginning in July 2025. These agencies are often first on the scene when a death is discovered, and their reports can have more detailed information on where remains were found. But relying on sheriffs’ records means our analysis undercounts migrant deaths in Texas, as it doesn’t include any deaths handled by local or state police. After we filed a request, it took periods of near daily calls to the offices to receive the records, if we received them at all. Some were provided with no charge. Other counties charged between $300 and $1,300 to fill our request. Counties warned that their records were incomplete, with an unknown number lost during a move, damaged, destroyed, or misplaced during transitions between sheriffs. Those delays were compounded because most agencies do not record whether a person is believed to have been crossing the border when they died. That’s despite provisions in some counties that allow officers to track far more granular details about other situations; Zapata County reports have a checkbox to indicate whether jewels were stolen in a burglary, for example, while Cameron County reports have one for whether a burglar entered through a chimney. Without a way to readily identify migrant deaths, offices had to pull records by hand, making the process slower, more costly, and more prone to error. We received usable records from 14 of these counties (records have yet to be received from Dimmit or Duval, and Maverick’s office charged a per-record fee that was cost prohibitive). Agencies generally sent us police reports for each individual case, amounting to over 4,000 pages of records in total. Some were handwritten documents. 

Except for the reports from Kenedy, Webb, and Hidalgo Counties, we pulled out the relevant information by hand. For those three counties, which sent large volumes of records, we used Anthropic’s Claude, accessed via API, to inspect each case report and pull out coordinates of the spots where remains were found; then we checked batches of those cases by hand to verify the AI’s accuracy. Agencies sent us records on a rolling basis from July 2025 to February 2026, and most did not specify the date through which their records were current. We generally trusted that agencies sent us cases they believed involved migrant deaths, since they had the most information about each case. But some records clearly suggested otherwise (indicating, for example, that someone died at home), and we excluded those cases. Several hundred cases were removed from our analysis because they didn’t include enough information for us to be certain where the remains were found. In fewer than 100 cases, coordinates were not listed but the description was specific enough for us to locate a point within 0.25 miles of where they were found—so we kept those in.  Compared with agencies in other states along the border, those in Texas provide far fewer details regarding how long ago someone may have died before remains were found or how far the decomposition of those remains had progressed. Some reports included this information, but many didn’t. While autopsy records sometimes have more details, many migrant autopsies in south Texas are done through the Webb County Medical Examiner, which charges a fee for each report. That was cost prohibitive given the scale of our analysis. MIT Technology Review consulted with Greg Hess, director of Arizona’s Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, on a framework for translating descriptions of the scenes, bodies, and causes of death available in many of these records into rough estimates for when a person may have died (more detail on this process is provided below). In total, we included more than 1,500 cases from our Texas records requests in our final analysis. Accessing Arizona records directly The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona handles death investigations for all border counties in the state except Yuma (we sourced Yuma’s records from the organization No More Deaths, as detailed below). The office determines which cases it believes to be border crossers. It publishes a data portal for these migrant deaths that’s updated monthly and shares its data with the organization Humane Borders, which then publishes it in a map and database. We included the data from 2015 through April 2026.
Humane Borders notes for each case how precise the location description is. We included only cases with GPS coordinates precise to within 300 feet. Collecting these coordinates has been standard practice since around 2012. The records also include an estimate of when the individual died, ranging from less than a day to at least six to eight months before remains were found. In total, we included more than 1,700 cases from Humane Borders in our analysis.
Data collected by No More Deaths To obtain data on deaths in California, New Mexico, Arizona’s Yuma County, and El Paso and Hudspeth Counties in Texas, we turned to the nonprofit organization No More Deaths, which has tracked migrant deaths since 2004. It publishes information about its records requests and its methodology.  Many of the cases in its database include GPS coordinates, sometimes with notes that the location is only approximate—for example, accurate to within half a mile or one mile. We included only cases where the location was known to within a quarter-mile. Migrants, most with children, follow a path along the concertina wire where ultimately they will placed under guard by Border Patrol after having crossed the Rio Grande on May 27, 2022 in Eagle Pass, Texas.JOHN LAMPARSKI/NURPHOTO VIA AP No More Death’s database includes, when available, information on the level of decomposition in which each set of remains was found. As with cases in Texas, MIT Technology Review consulted with PCOME’s Greg Hess on a framework for translating this information into rough estimates for when a person may have died.  Here’s where the No More Deaths data used in our analysis comes from: In California, No More Deaths requests records from the San Diego County medical examiner and the Imperial County coroner. Its latest data for Imperial County is from December 2025, and its latest for San Diego County is from October 2025.  In Yuma County, Arizona, No More Deaths requests records from the Yuma County medical examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In New Mexico, the organization requests data from the state’s Office of the Medical Investigator. Unlike most states, New Mexico has a statewide medical examiner, allowing No More Deaths to obtain migrant death data for the entire state. The latest data is from July 2025. For Hudspeth County, Texas, No More Deaths requests records from justices of the peace in Districts 1 and 2. The latest data is from December 2023. For El Paso County, Texas, records were from the El Paso County Office of the Medical Examiner. The latest data is from September 2025. In total, we included nearly 1,000 cases from No More Deaths in our analysis.  Total cases reviewed When accounting for all our data sources and excluding deaths without specific enough records to determine where remains were found, we analyzed a total of nearly 4,000 cases. 
Other notes  We generally assume that a person died where their remains were found. That may not necessarily be true: Remains can be moved by other people, flowing water, or animals. But medical examiners and researchers we consulted said such cases are rare. We excluded cases in which the virtual wall did not appear relevant. For example, we removed cases involving people who died inside Border Patrol stations or in car crashes during pursuits.  The deaths we analyzed reflect a variety of causes that may seem at first like very different sorts of surveillance failure. If someone slowly died of dehydration within view of a camera, for example, agents would have had far more time to intervene than they would have in a case where someone drowned quickly in a river or canal. But we included all these deaths because, in each one, the virtual wall could have prompted a response from agents. Surveillance towers Including a tower in our analysis required knowing three things: its location, its type (so that we could judge how far it is supposed to see), and the time it was installed. 
Locations The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been tracking and mapping CBP surveillance towers since 2023, using on-the-ground reporting, satellite imagery, and government documents obtained through public records requests. Its tally is an undercount; government records suggest that about 800 towers are currently deployed, while EFF has logged about 600. Our analysis therefore misses deaths that occurred near towers not yet catalogued by EFF. MIT Technology Review worked closely with EFF’s director of investigations, Dave Maass, throughout this project. Our tower data began with the database published by EFF in April 2026, but that map did not include towers that have been removed. We consulted EFF for the details on these former towers and added them to our database. We generally use EFF’s reference numbers for individual towers, but we changed some to ensure that each tower has a unique identifier. The locations are identified by GPS coordinates. We verified each tower’s coordinates by analyzing satellite imagery. Tower types Our analysis focused on towers of three main types. Certain towers mapped by EFF don’t fall into any of those categories, so we excluded them because it’s difficult to obtain information about how far they are supposed to be able to see. This includes some towers that are installed at Border Patrol checkpoints or stations. An integrated fixed tower (IFT) on Coronado Peak, Cochise County, Arizona.CREATIVE COMMONS An autonomous surveillance tower (AST) near Sunland Park, New Mexico.CENGIZ YAR FOR MITTR To know how far the main tower types could see, we consulted materials from tech companies and EFF’s research, led our own review of government documents, and interviewed former Border Patrol agents and officials. The distances described are consistent across these sources. But they are advertised estimates, not contractual guarantees: Some government records redact more specific information about a tower’s surveillance range in particular locations, citing security concerns. When towers were present To know if a tower in place now was present when someone died, it’s essential to know not just where it’s located but also when it was put there. To figure this out, we used multiple sources of satellite imagery.  Maass, at EFF, had previously analyzed some of the towers to determine when they first appeared. MIT Technology Review checked satellite imagery for these towers to confirm these timelines, and then checked for all the remaining towers. For each tower, we logged the date that it first appeared and, if it eventually disappeared, the last date it was present. We spent months meticulously checking when hundreds of towers appeared in multiple sources of satellite imagery to confirm there were no contradictions.  This is easier for certain tower types than others; towers from Anduril, for example, tend to go up where there was no prior infrastructure, and it’s fairly easy to see how a patch of empty desert gave way to the new tower and its trademark solar panels. Other towers, like IFTs, were often built on or near existing structures. For these, we leaned more closely on EFF’s expertise in analyzing the imagery.  When imagery wasn’t sufficient, we used Google Street View, government documents, or photographs collected by EFF to verify when towers went up. One limitation is that historical imagery of towers along the border is not available for every day in the past. Especially for older towers or those in remote locations, images may have been taken months or even a year apart. A tower visible in May and again in December could theoretically have been removed and reinstalled in the intervening months. But most tower systems are permanent structures. And multiple Border Patrol agents told us that even towers that are meant to be mobile, like autonomous towers, are in practice very rarely taken down or moved (consistent with this, we observed that semipermanent fences were erected around the sites of many Anduril towers). Another limitation is that even if a tower is visible at a particular time, that does not mean it was online. We can’t verify that it was functional, receiving power, or transmitting data. Our analysis therefore establishes when a tower was present, not whether it was operational. Heights We conducted a topographical analysis, detailed below, to see whether a tower’s view of a given person might have been blocked by the terrain. This required estimating how tall each tower is.  We included a minimum and maximum height for each tower, based on research from EFF. In select cases where the surveillance system was not on a typical tower but mounted to an existing structure, like a water tower or building, we used satellite imagery to estimate its height. The higher a tower is, the farther it can see. Our analysis With the data we collected, we could begin to see which deaths happened in range of the virtual wall. But for a given match between a set of remains and a tower to count, it needed to satisfy two criteria: 1) Distance: The death must have happened within the published surveillance range of the nearby camera. 2) Timing: The tower had to be present when the person was estimated to have died. An autonomous surveillance tower from Anduril captured January 6, 2022. Distance Minho Kim, an outside collaborator who is now a postdoctoral researcher at Stanford with a focus on wildfire mapping, led the distance analysis. His software ingested our database of human remains and our database of towers. Then it created a row for each time a set of remains was found near a given tower, along with the distance between the two. We then checked whether, for each match, the tower was actually present when the person died. Timing Sometimes, as with the Arizona cases, an estimate of when someone died is given in the original data; the medical examiner may note that a person died more than three weeks but less than five weeks before remains were found, for example.  In other cases, we used the level of decomposition, the cause of death, or both to calculate a window of time in which the person would likely have died. Finally, we compared this window with the time when we determined the tower was built.  This step took us many months and involved reviewing original police reports for hundreds of cases, inspecting photos of bodies, cross-referencing cases with news articles, interviewing medical examiners, and researching decomposition timelines. The resulting death windows are approximate, but they are the best estimates we could make from the information available in each case. We assigned different confidence levels to cases based on how these dates lined up. If a person’s entire estimated death window fell well after a tower was first observed, we felt confident the tower was present when they died. If any part of the death window fell before the tower was first observed, we excluded the case. Many cases involve skeletal remains. Remains decompose differently depending on location and season, but when records didn’t provide a specific estimate, we conservatively estimated that skeletal remains had been there for at least six months. For these and other cases without a specific estimate of when the person died, we used three years as a conservative cutoff: If a tower had been present for at least three years before the remains were found, we included the case, judging it unlikely that the person had died before the tower was installed and remained undiscovered that long. If the tower had been present for less than three years, we excluded it. Viewshed It is possible that someone who died within range of a tower could have been blocked from the tower’s view by terrain, vegetation, or buildings. We estimated the impact of this issue with a technique called topographical analysis. Kim, our collaborator, led this part of the analysis. Here’s how it works: Imagine a map of the border region divided into a grid, with each square having one value for that area’s elevation. Take a given match between a set of remains and a tower and draw a line between the tower’s estimated height and an estimated height of 5’ 6″ for the person who died. If the terrain along that path rises high enough to block the line between the two points, we estimate the tower’s view as obstructed. If it doesn’t, we estimate the view as clear. It’s not perfect. In the elevation data we used, each square represents an area 30 meters wide, or about 98 feet, and is assigned a single elevation. That means smaller changes in the terrain can be lost, particularly in steep or rugged areas where elevation changes quickly. Our analysis is therefore less about re-creating exactly what a tower could see than providing a rough estimate of whether terrain may have blocked a tower’s view of the spot where someone died.  We include results on our map whether a clear line of sight was estimated or not. Even if the location where someone died was blocked from a tower’s view, the person may have passed through areas visible to the tower before reaching that spot. It’s much harder to estimate whether a line of sight was blocked by vegetation. We are less concerned about this limitation because virtual-wall towers use thermal imaging, which can detect body heat through light vegetation. Dense vegetation, however, can still obstruct their view. Buildings pose a greater challenge. We could not reliably account for their locations and heights. Instead, we reviewed each tower’s surroundings and flagged towers located in or near urban areas. These notes warn readers that buildings may have limited what those towers could see. As the sun sets near McAllen TX, migrants that have crossed the Rio Grande surrender to U.S. Border Patrol near an area known as Rincon. MANI ALBRECHT/U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION Beyond the data  The most fundamental question in each of these cases, and for the families of anyone who died, is whether the US government saw someone attempting to cross into the country and never intercepted them—or never saw them at all.  This is all but impossible to answer with records or data—Border Patrol doesn’t disclose which alerts came in surrounding any given migrant death, and footage isn’t retained unless an internal investigation is triggered, which doesn’t happen unless a migrant dies while in custody. MIT Technology Review instead conducted dozens of interviews with people who worked for Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, or the Department of Homeland Security or who served as presidential advisors. These conversations yielded previously unreported details about how agents use surveillance technology, turned up instances where it has underperformed, and underscored how seldom its effectiveness is evaluated internally. We also sought out friends and family members of people who died near surveillance towers, using additional records, social media, and other research tools to find them. We approached these interviews using best practices for trauma-informed reporting. Beginning in September 2025, MIT Technology Review requested interviews with current Border Patrol agents and leadership at CBP, and we asked to visit the border to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the latest autonomous tower program. Following delays, which were in part related to DHS funding lapses, in July 2026 we were told our media request had been approved at the local level in Big Bend, Texas. We wanted to visit this area because Border Patrol is expanding the number of Anduril towers there. But when the request went up to the DHS headquarters for a final sign-off, the agency denied it. Before publishing our investigation, we sent detailed questions to CBP, Anduril, General Dynamics and Elbit. CBP and Anduril responded, but did not substantively address our questions. General Dynamics referred us to CBP. Elbit did not respond to our questions. MIT Technology Review thanks the following for their assistance with this project: Minho Kim, Stanford University Greg Hess, Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner  Stephanie Leutert, University of Texas at Austin Don White, Brooks County Sheriff’s Office

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Energy Secretary Secures Carolinas’ Grid Amidst Hot Weather Conditions

WASHINGTON—The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued an emergency order to mitigate the risk of blackouts in the Carolinas amid hot weather conditions. Issued pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, the order authorizes Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) to dispatch specified resources and to order their operation as needed to maintain reliability. The order also authorizes Duke, in collaboration with its Transmission Owners, to direct backup generation resources to operate as a last resort before declaring an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) 3 or during an EEA 3. This order was issued pursuant to an application from Duke submitted on September 18, 2026. “Today’s order will help secure reliable electricity access for millions of American families and businesses across North and South Carolina by making additional power generation, including backup power, available to use as needed,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. “It should come as no surprise that during the end of summer and early fall, there are fewer hours of daylight—and therefore, less power generation from solar power. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation and others have warned of the potential dangers late summer temperature spikes can pose to the grid when leaders prematurely retire reliable power sources. While past leaders’ energy subtraction policies have made the grid more vulnerable to blackouts when the sun doesn’t shine or the wind doesn’t blow, this administration remains committed to using every available tool to prevent blackouts.”  DOE estimates more than 35 GW of unused backup generation remains available nationwide.  The order is in effect upon issuance on September 18, 2026, through September 21, 2026. 

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Trump Administration Moves to Keep Indiana Coal Plants Operating to Support Grid Reliability

WASHINGTON—U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright issued emergency orders to keep two Indiana coal plants operational to ensure Americans in the Midwest region of the United States have continued access to affordable, reliable, and secure electricity. The orders direct the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO), CenterPoint Energy, and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) to take all measures necessary to ensure specified generation units at both the R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations in Indiana are available to operate. Certain generation units at these coal plants were scheduled to shut down at the end of 2025.  The orders will minimize the risk of unnecessary blackouts for the American people. Since the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) original orders were issued on December 23, 2025, the Schahfer and Culley coal plants have proven critical to MISO’s operations, operating during periods of high energy demand and low levels of intermittent energy production, including during Winter Storm Fern.   “Forcing reliable, dispatchable coal generation off the grid would compromise energy reliability and needlessly raises energy costs for Americans,” said Energy Secretary Wright. “Midwestern families should not be forced to pay the price for the misguided energy subtraction policies of the past. They deserve affordable, reliable, and secure energy, regardless of the wind blowing or the sun shining.” Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, coal generating plants across the country are being saved from premature retirement. For example, in 2025, more than 17 gigawatts of coal power electricity generation were saved from going offline.  The availability of R.M. Schahfer and F.B. Culley generating stations to operate will continue to be an asset to maintain reliability in the MISO region and is necessary to address elevated reliability risks in that region during extreme weather and reduce the risk of power outages that could threaten public health and safety. As

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Enbridge launches open season for West Texas Express natural gas pipeline

Enbridge has launched a non-binding open season for its proposed 2-bcfd West Texas Express (WTX) natural gas pipeline project, designed to transport Permian basin supply west from the Waha area to markets in and around El Paso, Tex. The proposed project responds to growing demand for reliable natural gas supplies from proposed power generation, utilities, generators, and industrial customers such as data centers across west Texas and downstream markets in Mexico, New Mexico, and Arizona, Enbridge said. WTX is currently expected to include more than 150 miles of new 42-in. OD pipeline. The project could also include laterals serving Hudspeth County, Tex., and delivery points at the US-Mexico border. Enbridge said WTX can be designed to connect with existing pipeline infrastructure based on customer requirements identified through the open season. Final capacity, routing, receipt and delivery points, and system design will be informed by market interest. Subject to securing sufficient commercial support and obtaining required approvals, Enbridge is targeting a fourth-quarter 2029 in-service date. The open season will close at 5 p.m. CDT, Sept. 25, 2026. Enbridge last week agreed to acquire Tallgrass Energy LP’s crude oil business for $2.55 billion in cash.

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Editorial: Let’s make a deal

The Trump administration announced Aug. 28, 2026, that the US and Venezuela had agreed to give the US majority control over development of more than 65 billion bbl of Venezuelan proven oil reserves. The agreement presents an extraordinary opportunity to the US oil industry, but also a great deal of risk, at least some of which should seem familiar. Before private capital follows Washington into Venezuela, the industry needs answers to some fundamental questions about the deal’s legal durability, political risk, commercial structure, and ultimate purpose. The agreement covers 17 fields and roughly 20% of Venezuela’s proved reserves. Development would be led by Barbados-based North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP)—controlled by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt López—under what the White House described as a 100-year concession. It’s a huge deal. But its timeline alone stretches credulity. A typical international concession agreement would last for 20-30 years, a term consistent with both in-country media reports and outside analysis. As noted by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Venezuela’s Organic Hydrocarbon Law, passed in January 2026 after Nicolás Maduro’s ouster, only allows “production participation contracts” to private companies, not concessions of any duration.1 Venezuela’s constitution also creates questions about the agreement. Article 150 requires National Assembly approval of “public interest” contracts to entities based outside Venezuela while Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the State. Beyond the deal itself Looking beyond legal and structural technicalities, large questions remain regarding both stable governance in Venezuela and the viability of any agreements struck in its absence. There has been no meaningful progress toward establishing a functional democracy in Venezuela since the US captured Maduro. Both Acting President (and former VP) Delcy Rodríguez and Betancourt owe much of their political and personal fortunes to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. Rodríguez has done a

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US sanctions bill targets Russian energy but gives Trump broad discretion

US President Donald Trump is poised to sign legislation aimed at increasing economic pressure on Russia over its war in Ukraine by targeting Russian oil and gas revenues and countries that continue to buy Russian energy. While the measure mandates broad sanctions, it gives Trump wide discretion over implementation, including which countries face tariffs, the tariff rates imposed, and whether sanctions provisions are waived. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, named for the late South Carolina senator who championed the legislation, passed the House Sept. 16 by a vote of 262-159 after clearing the Senate 86-11 in August. The measure now awaits Trump’s signature. The White House has said the administration supports the legislation and would recommend that Trump sign it into law. The legislation directs the president to impose broad sanctions and tariff measures targeting Russian energy exports and countries that facilitate sanctions evasion. However, Trump “may waive the application” of sanctions provisions, restrictions, or duties if he certifies to Congress that doing so is “in the national interest of the United States” and explains the basis for the decision. While the law mandates sanctions, it leaves key implementation decisions to the administration. Tariff provisions Within 30 days of enactment, the act requires the president to impose duties of up to 100% on goods imported from countries that fall within specified categories involving Russian oil and gas purchases or sanctions evasion. The covered countries include those among the five largest importers of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas by total volume during the 12 months preceding enactment, as well as countries that meet separate criteria for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. The administration must reassess those countries every 180 days. A country is exempt from the gas-related duties if its Russian gas imports accounted for

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